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A ROAD MAP TO ACHIEVE ENHANCED CULTURAL
DIVERSITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT
DECISIONS
BY
BRUCE COMLY FRENCHt
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The premise of this article is simple: administrators and faculty in law
schools should be committed to achieving enhanced cultural diversity on
their faculty. This goal is an article of faith within the liberal community
of legal education' and is even embodied in rules governing the accredita-
tion of law schools by the American Bar Association.2 These rules pro-
vide, in pertinent part:
The law school shall maintain equality of opportunity in legal education,
including employment of faculty and staff, without discrimination or seg-
regation on ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.
(a) The denial by a law school of admission to a qualified applicant will
be treated as made upon the ground of race, color, religion, national
origin, or sex if the ground of denial relied upon is:
(i) a state constitutional provision or statute that purports to forbid
the admission of applicants to a school on the ground of race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex; or
(ii) an admissions qualification of the school that is intended to pre-
vent the admission of applicants on the ground of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex though not purporting to do so.
t Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University, B.A., M.A.,
The American University, J.D. Antioch School of Law. The research assistance of Mr. William
Neville and Miles. Karen Muir, Luci Wellborn, and Ellen Sprovach, students at the Claude W.
Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University is recognized and appreciated. Special thanks are
due for the helpful insights of the participants at the Faculty Development Program, Ohio Northern
University College of Law, on April 26, 1990.
1. See infra Part E3. "[I]n 1981, 66 of the 94 law schools for which we had information had
one or more minority group members on their faculty and 34 had two or more members." Cham-
bers, SALT Survey: Minority Group Persons in Law School Teaching, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 439, 441
(1986). At the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools [AALS] in San Fran-
cisco, California, on January 5, 1990, the topic of "[p]romoting and [n]urturing the [aicademic
[vialues of [flaculty [d]iversity" was jointly presented by the AALS Executive Committee and the
AALS Committee on Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Teachers. Panelists included
Robert Belton (Vanderbilt), Paul A. Brest (Stanford), Robert L. Clayton (Tulane), Carole E.
Goldberg-Ambrose (UCLA), Michael A. Olivias (Houston), Donna E. Shalala (Chancellor-Wiscon-
sin at Madison), and Rennard J. Strickland (Wisconsin).
2. Standards for Approval of Law Schools, October, 1984, §§ 211-12.
1
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(b) The law school shall not use admission policies that preclude a di-
verse student body in terms of race, color, religion, national origin
or sex.
(c) The denial by a law school of employment to a qualified individual
will be treated as made upon the ground of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex if the ground of denial relied upon is an em-
ployment policy of the school which is intended to prevent the em-
ployment of individuals on the ground of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex though not purporting to do so.
(e) Equality of opportunity in legal education includes equal opportu-
nity to obtain employment. Each school should communicate to
every employer to whom it furnished assistance and facilities for
interviewing and other placement functions the school's firm expec-
tation that the employer will observe the principle of equal opportu-
nity and will avoid objectionable practices such as
(i) refusing to hire or promote members of groups protected by this
policy because of the prejudices of clients or of professional or
official associates;
(ii) applying standards in the hiring and promoting of such individ-
uals that are higher than those applied otherwise;
(iii) maintaining a starting or promotional salary scale as to such
individuals that is lower than is applied otherwise; and
(iv) disregarding personal capabilities by assigning, in a predeter-
mined or mechanical manner, such individuals to certain kinds
of work or departments.
Standard 212
Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, the law
school shall demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by con-
crete action, a commitment to providing full opportunities for the study
of law and entry into the profession by qualified members of groups (no-
tably racial and ethnic minorities) which have been victims of discrimina-
tion in various forms. This commitment would typically include a
special concern for determining the potential of such applicants through
the admission process, special recruitment efforts, and a program which
assists in meeting the unusual financial needs of many such students, pro-
vided that no school is obligated to apply standards for the award of
financial assistance different from those applied to other students.3
However, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court4 cast
doubt upon the constitutional validity of currently employed affirmative
action policies.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part B.
2
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This article will review the legal climate affecting the access of minori-
ties to the legal citadel by first considering the solicitous treatment given
by the federal courts to the demands of African American students to be
admitted to law and other professional schools.' Building upon this early
case law under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment
which presaged the coming of Brown v. Board of Education,6 attention
will then be directed to the important cases endorsing affirmative action
in higher education admissions schemes,7 voluntary affirmative action
plans by public8 and private employers,9 and the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the societal role model value of preferentially hired minority
public school teachers.' °
The analyses which follow will show that these decisions generally es-
tablished that: access to legal educational opportunities for minorities is
of special concern to the federal judiciary; voluntary hiring plans which
give preferential treatment to the appointment of African Americans and
other minorities to positions in legal education may be protected from
attack by members of the cultural majority as reverse discrimination; af-
firmative action plans which unduly trample upon the rights of specific
members of the nondiscriminating majority are likely to be found consti-
tutionally infirm.
Were the conclusions articulated above to represent the end of the
Supreme Court's analyses concerning affirmative action hiring, one safely
could conclude that most affirmative action hiring proposals would easily
pass constitutional muster.
However, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest a new antipathy to-
ward programs which give preference to minorities. This trend is not yet
a full-blown retreat from the expansive holdings which sustain voluntary
affirmative action plans such as United Steel Workers of America v.
Weber" and Johnson v. Transportation Agency,"2 because the Court has
recently approved race specific remedies in the context of affirmative, in-
5. See infra Part Al and 2. Various definitions of "minority" abound. A relatively sensitive
definition can be found in District of Columbia law:
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(1) The term "minority" means Black Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific
Islander Americans, and Hispanic Americans, who by virtue of being members of the foregoing
groups, are economically and socially disadvantaged because of historical discrimination prac-
ticed against these groups by institutions within the United States of America. I D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1142 (1)(1983).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an interesting account of the decision, see Kluger, SIMPLE JUS-
TICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (1976).
7. Regent s of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
8. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
9. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
10. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
11. 443 U.S. 193. See infra Part A6.
12. 480 U.S. 616. See infra Part A6.
1991]
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tentional, and continuing employer or local union discrimination only.' 3
Thus, intentional racial discrimination by employers has been found to
violate either the Constitution' 4 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,15 or both. These practices will continue to be invalidated by the
Court. Additionally, the Supreme Court fashioned a second approach to
the finding of liability in employment discrimination cases. This "dispa-
rate impact" approach was developed to allow a person alleging discrimi-
nation in employment to point to statistical data which suggest a dearth
of minorities in the workforce as a starting point for further analysis.
Success in establishing a prima facie case shifts the intermediate proof
burdens to the defendant employer to justify those business practices
which have the effect of discriminating against minorities. But the winds
of change are sweeping broadly, as disparate impact discrimination mod-
els are limited 16 and compensatory and remedial governmental benefit
programs are swept aside.'" Supreme Court Justices have issued shrill
dissents to accompany the recent decisions favorable to remedial
programs. 8
The American Association of Law Schools (AALS) recommends af-
firmative action programs which call for either the creation of separate
slots for minority candidates or for not filling vacancies occasioned by
normal turnover other than with minority candidates. Under the estab-
lished case law discussed in this article, these programs are doomed. 9 A
new approach is needed if cultural diversity is to be enhanced within the
law school teaching community.
A new qualification factors approach will be presented. This system,
modeled upon the concepts of job-related validation studies already
known under Title VII case law and federal administrative regulations,
20
has an application broader than merely sustaining desirable culturally
diverse appointments. Rather, the approach presented will cause a
searching inquiry into all faculty appointments decisions. Relegated to a
position of historical curiosity is the all-too-often elitist approach which
presently calls for careful scrutiny of applicants. Cultural diversity be-
comes but one, albeit a most important, factor of several designed to
13. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); see also Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
14. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
15. See infra Part A3-5.
16. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
17. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); but see, Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 1467 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. See infra Part C3.
20. Concerning job-related tests and their validation, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 431 (1975); EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607 to 1607.18 (1990); 3 Larson, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 75.00, 77.00, 78.00.
4
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properly define job needs and to assure the appointment of an appropri-
ate candidate. When faculty appointments committees evaluate cultural
diversity in this manner and carefully articulate institutional needs for
each specific vacancy, success in sustaining such a system against attack
is possible.21
This article will conclude with the application of the qualification fac-
tors approach to the filling of a faculty vacancy at a law school.2 2
A. The Constitutional and Statutory Environment
1. Equal Protection: Separate is Equal
The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides the basic analytic framework for the
protection of different groups of people in our nation. Section 1, in rele-
vant part, provides that "[N]o State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 23
This great constitutional guarantee was part of the revolution in fed-
eral - state relations which was reflected in the Reconstruction Amend-
ments to the federal Constitution.24 Ironically in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 5
the equal protection of the laws which the fourteenth amendment was
designed to grant was interpreted to allow state-segregated seating on
public conveyances. In Plessy, the Supreme Court considered a Louisi-
ana statute that required all railway companies to provide "equal but
separate accommodations" for black and white passengers.26 Plessy, who
alleged his ancestry was seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African,
attempted to use the coach reserved for Whites.27 The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied his request for a writ of prohibition against the
judge who was to try him for a violation of the statute.28
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ and held that the
statute was not a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 29 Further, the
Court held that the thirteenth amendment, abolishing slavery and invol-
untary servitude, was not violated.30 The Court's majority reasoned that
laws such as this one related only to "social" equality, not to political or
civil equality. The Court held, social equality was not a goal of the Equal
Protection Clause, and could be attained only through voluntary action
21. See infra Part C.
22. See infra Part E.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I (emphasis added).
24. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV.
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
26. Id. at 537-40 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 538.
28. Id. at 540.
29. Id. at 552.
30. Id. at 542.
1991]
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by individuals, not by statutes. 31 In dissent, the first Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan offered the hope that equal protection would afford qualita-
tive equal protection at some not too distant point in the future.32
Plessy placed a judicial imprimatur of legitimacy upon a system of
American apartheid. Plessy was read broadly to include most realms of
public life by subsequent court majorities, rather than being limited to its
facts. While the democratic socialization process inherent in public and
higher education could easily have justified not extending Plessy to edu-
cation, the judiciary was unwilling to adopt this view. Thus, the narrow
reach of federal equal protection neatly dovetailed with restrictive read-
ings of state constitutional provisions during the nineteenth century con-
cerning the rights afforded to African Americans hoping to enter the
mainstream of American political, social, and economic life.33
2. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Coming of Brown:
Separate May not be Equal in Legal Education
Schools in many states remained de jure segregated through much of
the first half of the twentieth century. The Equal Protection Clause grad-
ually became available in legal education when African Americans in
southern and border states challenged their exclusion from publicly fi-
nanced education and from the vastly superior segregated white educa-
tional institution. These challenges met with continuing success,
although the vindication of rights was a painfully slow process in protect-
ing the individual litigant who was the victim of the discriminatory state
law.
In Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada,34 decided in 1938, petitioner
Gaines, an African American, was refused admission to the School of
Law of the University of Missouri.35 Gaines' work and credits at the
undergraduate institution he attended qualified him for admission to the
School of Law of the University of Missouri.36 However, he was refused
admission upon the ground that it was "contrary to the constitution,
laws and public policy of the State to admit a negro as a student in the
University of Missouri." 37
Gaines brought an action for mandamus to compel the curators of the
university to admit him, asserting that the refusal constituted a denial by
the state of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth
31. Id. at 551.
32. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1850).
34. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
35. Id. at 342.
36. Id. at 343.
37. Id.
6
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amendment.38 Missouri's defense to his suit for admission was that
pending the establishment of a Black law school in the state, it would pay
Gaines' tuition in an out-of-state school.39
The Court's majority concluded that the state was obligated to furnish
''within its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to
those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race,
whether or not other negroes sought the same opportunity."'  Only in
the absence of such facilities, was Gaines entitled to be admitted to the
existing state law school.4 '
In Sipuel v. Board of Regents,42 decided in 1948, the petitioner, an
African American female "concededly qualified to receive the profes-
sional legal education offered by the State, applied for admission to the
School of Law of the University of Oklahoma."43 That institution was
the only school for legal education supported and maintained by the tax-
payers of Oklahoma.44 After being denied admission, Sipuel applied for
a writ of mandamus alleging her application for admission was denied
solely because of her color.45 The state district court refused to grant the
writ; this action was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.46
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court judg-
ment, citing Gaines for the proposition that the state must provide admis-
sion of qualified African Americans to the state's only law school when
the state has denied admission solely on the basis of race.47
In Sweatt v. Painter,4 8 decided in 1950, the petitioner, an African
American, was refused admission to the University of Texas School of
Law on the ground that equivalent facilities were offered by a Texas law
school open only to members of his race.49 The trial court recognized
that this situation was a denial of equal protection, but rather than order
the school to admit the petitioner, the trial court continued the case to
allow the state to supply substantially equal facilities in the separate law
school.5 Such a school was established while the appeal was pending
and the appellate court remanded the case. The trial court found the
new school for Blacks was "substantially equivalent" to the UT School of
38. Id. at 342.
39. Id. at 342-43.
40. Id. at 351.
41. Id. at 352.
42. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
43. Id. at 632.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
49. Id. at 632.
50. Id.
1991]
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Law.5' The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this decision.
In doing so, the Court expressly reserved the question of the validity of
the separate but equal doctrine, holding that the newly established law
school was not substantially equal.52 The white law school had a better
faculty, a better offering of courses, a better library, and a wider range of
activities than the law school established for blacks.53
During the same term, in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,54 the
Supreme Court considered the issue of "whether a state may, after ad-
mitting a student to graduate instruction in its state university, afford
him different treatment from other students solely because of his race."55
McLaurin, an African American male, applied for admission to the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma in order to pursue curriculum leading to a Doctor-
ate in Education.56 His application was denied pursuant to a state statute
which "made it a misdemeanor to maintain or operate, teach or attend a
school in which both white and negroes are enrolled or taught. '"57
Relying upon Gaines and Sipuel, the district court held that the "State
had a constitutional duty to provide [the appellant] with the education he
sought as soon as it provided that education for applicants of any other
[racial or ethnic] group."5" Assuming, however, that the state would fol-
low this mandate, the court refused to grant the mandatory injunction.59
The Oklahoma legislature then amended the statutes "to permit the
admission of negroes to institutions of higher learning attended by white
students, in cases where those institutions offered courses not available in
the negro schools."' Yet, the amendments provided "that in such cases
the programs of instruction 'shall be given at such colleges or institutions
of higher education upon a segregated basis.' "61
Thereafter, McLaurin was admitted to the graduate school, subject to
the rules authorizing segregation mandated by the President of the Uni-
versity. He was required to sit in an assigned seat in the classroom in a
row "[rjeserved [flor [c]olored" students; he was assigned to a table in
the library; and he was permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria
as other students, but was again assigned to a special table.62
The United States Supreme Court stated that although the restrictions
51. Id.
52. Id. at 633-36.
53. Id. at 632-33.
54. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
55. Id. at 638.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 639.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 640.
8
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were imposed in order to comply with the statutory requirements, they
signified that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for profes-
sional and graduate study, sets colored students apart from the other
students.6" This resulted in the student being handicapped in his pursuit
of effective graduate instruction. The Court further held, such measures
"impair and inhibit the student's ability to study, engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and in general, deny him the
right to learn his profession. '
The Court relied upon Sweatt in concluding that "the conditions under
which [McLaurin was] required to receive his education deprive[d] him
of his personal and present right to equal protection of the laws."65
"Having been admitted to a state-supported graduate school, McLaurin
was entitled to receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as
students of other races.",
66
From 1938 until 1950, with consistent but turtle-like speed, the United
States Supreme Court eliminated barriers to access by African Ameri-
cans to professional education. The Court rendered these decisions
within the constraints of the then-existing equivalency doctrine. The role
of intangibles, in the thinking of the Court's majority, can be seen to
emerge tentatively in McLaurin. This concept would become an impor-
tant linchpin in the Court's unanimous Brown v. Bd. of Education of To-
peka67 decision which dismantled segregation in the public school
system.68
3. Brown: The Revolutionary Change in Judicial Perspective and
Its Subsequent Retrenchment
In the seminal case of Brown, Brown and three other cases were each
focused on the permissibility of local governments conducting school sys-
tems which segregated students by race.69 In each case, young African
Americans sought admission to public schools on a nonsegregated basis.
In three of the cases, the lower federal or state court based its decision
upon the separate but equal doctrine as formulated in Plessy.7° Plaintiffs
challenged the validity of the doctrine, arguing that segregated schools
63. Id. at 641.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 642.
66. Id.
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. See infra Part A3.
69. 347 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1954); Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v.
County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Gebhart v. Belton, I A.2d 137 (Sup. Ct.
Del. 1952).
70. Id. at 487-88. In Gebhart, the Supreme Court of Delaware followed the "equal but sepa-
rate" doctrine but ordered the plaintiffs to be sent to the white schools because they were better than
the negro schools. Id.
1991]
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were not equal and could never be equal.7
The Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule Plessy or hold the "sep-
arate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional, but rather, the Court limited
its holding to the conclusion that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."" 2 The Court referred to
the earlier recognition in Sweatt and McLaurin that intangibles played a
considerable role in the value educational opportunities offered.73
The Court noted that quantifiable tangible equality in matters such as
curricula offerings, buildings, books, qualifications and salaries of teach-
ers was occurring in a number of states. However, the Court held that a
difference in "intangibles," such as separation, would render a school un-
equal. 74  Thus, the Court moved beyond a narrow calculation of raw
quantifiable equality: instead, it looked to the effect of segregation on
public education. In particular, the Court found that to separate African
American children "from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." 75
This revolutionary opinion changed the entire focus of equal protec-
tion law: the "separate-but-equal" doctrine was not yet buried, but the
end was in sight. 76 The socializing function of the public schools was
recognized, and the American system of apartheid was to lose its legal
sanction. Brown became the jurisprudential underpinning for the efforts
by the federal judiciary to integrate the public educational systems. Sub-
sequent decisions of the Supreme Court continued to reaffirm the com-
mitment of Brown to integrated public schools.77
While the earlier higher education decisions undergirded Brown, so
Brown became the impetus for federal legislative initiatives which would
create the statutory basis for the opening of institutions of higher educa-
tion to a broader cross-section of the nation's diverse cultures.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 495.
73. Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
74. Id. at 493.
75. Id. at 494. Brown generated reams of scholarly comment. Several oft-cited articles include:
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Black,
The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). For a broader perspective:
Governments and educational institutions should read Brown as prescribing a set of affirmative
obligations.... [T]his process of [affirmative action] should not be limited to the public secon-
dary schools. Indeed, in so far as the idea of progress is concerned, universities are as important
if not much more important than the public school[.] ... (In the area of admissions,] it appears
that a lottery would be the best way to achieve the world university that I have been advocating.
Parker, Ideas, Affirmative Action and the Ideal University, 10 NOVA L.J. 764, 764-66 (1986).
76. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
77. Id. at 483. See also Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
10
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4. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The emphasis in this article has been thus far upon student access to
public educational opportunities. The Civil Rights Act of 196478 serves
the dual purposes of nondiscrimination in university admission policies7 9
and in related faculty employment decisions.8 ° Congress, in enacting this
monumental statute, built upon the legacy of Brown to ensure a national
community where opportunities would not be limited on account of one's
race, national origin, color, religion, or sex.8' Early litigation under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, affecting higher education, attempted to dis-
mantle continuing dual-segregated systems.82 While some cases continue
to be filed,83 a shift in litigation emphasis has been occasioned by the
second generation issue under the Act: that of the proper implementa-
tion of race-and gender-conscious affirmative action programs. 84
Different definitions of affirmative action abound,85 but the concept
most likely to be perceived by Americans is a system which places the
question of one's race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age,86 or possi-
ble handicap87 into the decision making process. Remedial models range
from specific hiring quotas or goals 88 to remedy specific cases of inten-
tional discrimination, to numerical goals of population parity,89 to the
inclusion of the factors listed above in a laundry list of criteria to be
considered. 90
In DeFunis v. Odergaard,9' the first case to reach the Supreme Court
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (1988).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
82. Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1972).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642. (E.D. La. 1988) (suit by the United
States to end state dual and segregated system in higher education.); Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp
1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987), rev'd, 893 F.2d 732 (1990), reh'g granted, 898 F.2d 1014 (1990).
84. See supra Part BS, 6, and 7 and infra Part C.
85. Affirmative action may be viewed in several ways: quotas favoring minorities or women;
preference systems in which women and minorities are given some preference over white men; self
examination plans in which failure to reach goals triggers self study to determine whether discrimi-
nation is interfering with decision making; attempts to include more women and miniorities in appli-
cant pools; and commitments not to discriminate. D. Oppenheimer, Distinguishing Five Models of
Affirmative Action, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 42 (1988).
86. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
88. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
89. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
90. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
91. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). For conflicting analyses of De Funis, see Greenawalt, Judicial Scru-
tiny of "Benign " Racial Preference In Law School Admissions 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975); Gris-
wold, Some Observations on the DeFunis Case, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 512 (1975); Henkin, De Funis:
An Introduction, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483 (1975); Larinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard." The "Non-Deci-
sion" With a Message, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 520 (1975); Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and
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which squarely pitted preferential race-conscious affirmative action
against an excluded white male, the Justices effectively evaded the issue
presented, finding that DeFunis' imminent graduation rendered the case
moot. While the court was able to duck the thorny issue in DeFunis v.
Odergaard, the constitutional or statutory justification of a preferential
program having the effect of retarding the educational opportunities of
white males was ultimately faced.92
5. The Reverse Discrimination Test Case: Bakke
Whatever might be said about other aspects of American social and
political life, the role of higher education in a democracy is fundamental.
Leaders trained in the great thoughts of antiquity and those trained in
the concepts now in vogue, meet one another in the university and create
network groups for the future governance of public and private institu-
tions. Denial of access to that entire educational experience to a class of
persons cannot be justified in a properly functioning American political
democracy.
The case of Regents of University of California v. Bakke93 presented
the issue of whether an admissions program's utilization of race as a sub-
stantial factor in the consideration of an applicant's acceptance, to the
point of reserving spaces for minorities, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment and section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964." 4 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that such plans did violate the Constitution and Title VT. 95
The facts creating the controversy were as follows. The admissions
program at the University of California at Davis medical school con-
sisted of two procedures - regular and special - with a separate admis-
sions screening committee for each.9 6 Under the regular procedure,
candidates with an undergraduate grade point average below 2.5 were
automatically rejected. 97 From those not rejected on this criterion, about
one out of six were interviewed and rated.9" The full admissions commit-
tee then reviewed the applicant's file and made offers accordingly.99 The
special procedure applied to candidates who "wished to be considered as
'economically and/or educationally disadvantaged' or as members of a
Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 534 (1975); Pollak, Defunis Non est
Disputandum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 495 (1975).
92. See, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 269-70.
95. Id. at 271-72.
96. Id. at 272-73.
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id. at 274.
99. Id.
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'minority group.' 00 If selected for the special admissions procedure
they were not ranked with those in the regular procedure.'"' No White
person was ever admitted under the special procedure.'°2 The special ad-
missions committee interviewed one-fifth of the applicants and then rec-
ommended the top candidates until sixteen special selections had been
made. t1
In 1973, Allan Bakke, a white male, applied for admission to the Uni-
versity. 1o The 1973 application form asked if the applicant wished to be
considered under the special program for those from economically and
educationally disadvantaged backgrounds."5 Mr. Bakke was not so con-
sidered.I Although he scored 468 on a scale of 500 in his interview, he
was rejected because he had applied late and only scores of 470 or better
were being accepted at that time.t0 7 In 1974, he reapplied and again was
not considered under the regular procedure.'08 He applied early, and
although he scored 549 out of 600, he was again rejected."°9 In both
1973 and 1974, special applicants were admitted with lower MCAT
scores, grade point averages, and interview scores than Bakke's."o
Bakke filed suit in state court for mandatory, injunctive, and declara-
tory relief."' He alleged that the special admissions program violated
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, similar provisions of the
California Constitution, and section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The University cross-claimed for a declaration that its spe-
cial admission program was lawful." 2
A California superior court found that the program operated as a ra-
cial quota and therefore violated the fourteenth amendment, the Califor-
nia Constitution, and Title VI. "3 But the court did not order Bakke's
admission. 1 4 Both Bakke and the University appealed.' The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, without considering the state constitution or Title
VI, held that the Equal Protection Clause required that, "no applicant
may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less quali-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 275.
102. Id. at 276.
103. Id. at 275.
104. Id. at 276.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 276.
108. Id. at 277.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 278.
113. Id. at 279.
114. Id. at 279. The court held that Bakke "had failed to carry his burden of proving that he
would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program." Id.
115. Id.
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fled, as measured by standards applied without regard to race."' 16 The
state court held that since Bakke had established that racial discrimina-
tion played a significant role in the rejection by the university of his ap-
plication, the burden shifted to the University to prove that Bakke would
not have been admitted even without the special procedure." 7 The Uni-
versity conceded its inability to carry its burden of proof and the state
supreme court ordered that Bakke be admitted to the University. "8s Fur-
ther review was then sought in the United States Supreme Court." 9
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Supreme Court. He
examined the legislative history behind Title VI which revealed "a con-
gressional intent to halt federal funding of entities that violate a prohibi-
tion of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution."' 20 After
extensive examination, Justice Powell found that Title VI prohibits racial
classifications that violate either the fifth amendment or the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
2 1
Justice Powell rejected the University's argument that the lower courts
should not have applied strict scrutiny. He stated that "[r]acial and eth-
nic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination.""' He found that the use of race
denied some persons the state-provided benefit of higher education;
therefore, the classification was suspect.' 2 3 He further stated that to jus-
tify the use of such classifications, the state had to show, under the Equal
Protection Clause, "that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'neces-
sary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its
interest."' 124 Justice Powell found that the classification was impermissi-
ble "in the absence of judicial, legislative or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations;"' 25 that the University had not car-
ried its burden of proving that "it must prefer members of a particular
ethnic group" to improve medical services in deprived areas; 126 and that
the sole criterion of ethnic diversity "would hinder rather than further
attainment of genuine diversity."' 127 Therefore, the Univeristy failed to
carry its burden of "demonstrat[ing] that the challenged classification is
116. Id. at 280.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 281.
120. Id. at 284.
121. Id. at 287.
122. Id. at 291.
123. Id. at 305.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 307.
126. Id. at 311.
127. Id. at 315.
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necessary to promote a substantial state interest."' 28
Justice Powell did find, however, that race can be used as a qualifica-
tion but not the qualification. 12 9 Justice Powell concluded by (1) af-
firming that the special admissions program was invalid under the
fourteenth amendment, (2) reversing the lower court's judgment en-
joining the University from ever using race in the consideration of appli-
cants, and (3) affirming the injunction ordering respondent Bakke's
admission. 3 1 While a five member majority did vote to invalidate the
specific program that was before the Court in Bakke, 13 ' there was no
majority opinion regarding the basis for that invalidation. One or more
Justices voted for one of three different bases for this ruling.
1 32
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurred in part
and dissented in part. Justice Brennan wrote that the admissions pro-
gram was constitutional and therefore all aspects of the California court's
decision should be reversed. '1 He opined that "Title VI prohibits only
those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if employed by a state or its agencies; it does not bar the preferen-
tial treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal
discrimination .... 13' Further, Justice Brennan stated that racial classi-
fications are not per se invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.'
35
Nevertheless, those classifications designed to further remedial purposes
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."'' 36
He pointed out that race has "too often been inexcusably utilized to
stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments of society."' 37
"Race, like illegitimacy and gender, is an immutable characteristic."'
131
He found that discrimination based on these characteristics was inconsis-
tent with the concept that "legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."'139
Brennan summarized his views and pointed out that because the risk
exists that racial classifications can be misused, it is "inappropriate to
inquire only whether there is any conceivable basis that might sustain
128. Id. at 320.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See infra text and accompanying notes.
132. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 379.
134. Id. at 328.
135. Id. at 360.
136. Id. at 359 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) and Caraig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)).
137. Id. at 360.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 360-61.
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such a classification."" Instead, to justify such a classification, an im-
portant and articulated purpose for its use must be shown."''
Justice Brennan found that the University's goal of remedying the ef-
fects of past societal discrimination was important to justify the use of
sufficiently race-conscious admissions programs."' 42 This classification
was acceptable where the school could show a sound basis for its conclu-
sion that minority underrepresentation was substantial and chronic, and
that the existence of past discrimination was an impediment to minorities
seeking access to the professional schools. 143 Brennan continued by stat-
ing that the school did not stigmatize any discrete group or individual by
setting aside a reasonable percentage of class positions for only qualified
minority applicants.'" The University program was valid and did not
violate the Constitution. Brennan noted that there was no distinction
between setting a fixed number of places for disadvantaged minority ap-
plicants, which the University did, and adding a set number of points to
their admissions rating with the expectation that it would result in the
admission of an approximated number of qualified applicants.145 Thus,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun would allow race-con-
scious classifications for the purpose of remedying past societal
discrimination. '1
Justice White wrote to consider the question of whether Title VI pro-
vided for a private cause of action since "[flour Justices are apparently of
the view that ... [it] exists, and four Justices assume it for purposes of
this case."' 4 7 However, he concluded that a technically private cause of
action did not exist, 148 and he voted to sustain the University program.
Justice Marshall, while joining Justice Brennan's opinion, wrote sepa-
rately to opine that the Court's decision stopped affirmative action pro-
grams.'49  Justice Blackmun made some general observations on
affirmative action 5° and the Equal Protection Clause.' 5 '
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined an
opinion by Justice Stevens which asserted that the question of whether
race could ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision was not an
140. Id. at 361.
141. Id. at 361.
142. Id. at 362.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 375-76.
145. Id. at 378.
146. Id. at 369.
147. Id. at 379-80 (White, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 386.
149. Id. at 387, 402 (Marshall, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 402 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. Id.
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issue to be resolved in the case before the Court.' 52 Thus, any discussion
of that issue was inappropriate. 5 3 These four Justices believed that if the
state court correctly decided that the University's special admissions pro-
gram was illegal, the Supreme Court, regardless of its views about the
legality of admissions programs, should affirm the California Supreme
Court judgment.154
To further demonstrate that plenary consideration of affirmative ac-
tion plans was improper, Justice Stevens noted that the judgment as orig-
inally entered by the trial court contained four separate paragraphs, two
of which he viewed as critical. "' "Paragraph 3 declared that the Univer-
sity's special admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment,
the state constitution, and Title V."'56 "The trial court did not order
the University to admit Bakke because it concluded that Bakke had not
shown that he would have been admitted if there had been no special
program."' 5 7 Then, Justice Stevens noted that, in paragraph two of its
judgment, "[the California Superior Court] ordered the University to
consider Bakke's application for admission without regard to his race or
the race of any other applicant."' 5 The order did not include any broad
prohibition against any use of race in the admissions process; its terms
were clearly limited to the University's consideration of Bakke's applica-
tion."' 59 Justice Stevens wrote that there was no need to consider consti-
tutional questions either, because the program was invalid when read
against section 601 of the Title VI.' 6°
While the Court's analyses in Bakke resolved the dilemma underlying
Allen Bakke's admission to the medical school, the plethora of opinions
generated left for another day the development of a coherent set of prin-
ciples concerning this controversial issue.' 6 ' The use of race as one of
152. Id. at 441 (Stewart, C.J., Stevens, and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 408-09.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 409.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 409-10.
160. Id. at 412-13.
161. The following are illustrative articles: Smith, Reflection on a Landmark: Some Preliminary
Observations on the Development and Significance of Regents of the University of California v. Allan
Bakke, 21 How. L.J. 72 (1978) ("the Court could find that the use of race is proscribed by [Title
VII]"); Days, Minority Access to Higher Education in the Post-Bakke Era, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 491
(1984) ("Yet one is hard-pressed to arrive at any confident conclusions about the impact of that
ruling upon minority admission to higher education."); DeRonde and DeRonde, The Post-Bakke
Decisions - Walking the Equal Protection Gangplank, 10 W. ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1983) ("[T]he
simple statement by Justice Powell sanctioning the use of ethnicity as a factor but not the factor in
admissions criteria will prove historically to be more than a mere crack in the cornerstone of equal
protection."); Williams, A Critical Analyses of the Bakke case, 16 S.U.L. REV. 129 (1989).
1991]
17
French: A Road Map to Achieve Enhanced Cultural Diversity in Legal Educat
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1991
236 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:219
several factors, rather than as a sole factor, in race or gender conscious
decisionmaking as described in Justice Powell's opinion, is the continuing
legacy of the Court's opinions. 162
6. The Voluntary Affirmative Action Cases
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,'63 presented the issue of
whether Title VII 64 prohibits race-conscious affirmative action plans by
employers in the private sector. The Supreme Court, by a 5-2 decision,
held that such plans were not in violation of the relevant provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.165
In 1974, an affirmative action plan was entered into as part of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between the United Steelworkers of America
and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. The plan was
designed to eliminate obvious racial imbalances in Kaiser's craft-work
forces by implementing on-the-job training. The plan reserved for Black
employees fifty percent of the openings in the training programs. 166
In accordance with the plan, Kaiser's Gramery, Louisiana, plant se-
lected thirteen craft trainees on the basis of seniority to fill craft open-
ings. Seven of the trainees were black and six were white with the most
senior black having less seniority than several white workers who were
rejected. 167 Brian Weber, a worker who fell into the category of rejected
white workers, instituted a class action in the district court, alleging that
the plan violated sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII. The district court
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the union and Kaiser from
denying access to training programs on the basis of race. 168 The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that although the plan was a bona fide affirma-
tive action plan, it still was based on race in violation of Title VII. 169 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion. He emphasized that the
court's inquiry was very narrow in that the fourteenth amendment did
not apply to the private employer. Further, Title VII requirements were
given limited consideration as the Court rejected a literal interpretation
of Title VII, choosing to place greater emphasis on the legislative history
of Title VII and the historical context from which it arose. 17' Finally,
the Court evaluated the plan itself. The Court found "the plan does not
162. See DeRonde and DeRonde, The Post-Bakke Decisions - Walking the Equal Protection
Gangplank, 10 W. ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1983).
163. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
165. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
166. Id. at 199.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 200.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 195.
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unnecessarily trammel the interests of the White employees. The plan
does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement
with new black hirees."''' "Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure;
it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a
manifest racial imbalance."' 72 Justice Powell and Justice Stevens took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority opinion and in the
judgment of the Court; however, he wrote a separate opinion to discuss
the narrow "arguable violation"' 73 theory. He observed that the Kaiser
preferential hiring scheme was a reasonable response for an employer to
take regardless of whether a court could order the same step as a rem-
edy. 174 By using such a program, a company is capable of avoiding the
task of identifying victims of past discrimination and thus, avoiding
claims for backpay. If victims of prior discriminatory practices should
be benefited by the scheme, the company can mitigate its liability to those
individuals. Further, Justice Blackmun noted, to the extent that Title
VII liability is predicated on the "disparate effect" of past hiring prac-
tices, the scheme makes it less likely that such an effect could be
shown. 175
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Court declined to consider the
narrow "arguable violation" approach and chose instead to use an inter-
pretation of Title VII which permits affirmative action by the employer
whenever the job category in question is "traditionally segregated.' 76
He suggested the first departure from the "arguable violations" ap-
proach to be when the Court measured an individual employer's capacity
for affirmative action solely in terms of a statistical disparity. 177 The sec-
ond departure from that approach was allowing an employer to redress
discrimination that "lies wholly outside the bounds of Title VII.' 71 To
illustrate this second departure, Justice Blackmun referred to the earlier
case, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 179 where the Court de-
termined that Title VII provided no remedy for pre-Act discrimination,
although the purposeful discrimination that creates a "traditionally seg-
regated job category" may have entirely predated the Act.' 80 He con-
171. Id. at 208.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 211-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring and concurring in the judgment). The "arguable
violation" theory is discussed in Judge Wisdom's dissent from the court of appeals decision. See
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1976).
174. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211 (1979).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 212.
177. Id. at 213.
178. Id. at 214.
179. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
180. Weber, 443 U.S. at 196.
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cluded that although the narrow theory would apply in this case, the
Court's broader theory of "traditionally segregated job categories" was
the better theory because "[t]o make the arguable violation standard
work, it would have to be set low enough to permit the employer to prove
it without obligating himself to pay a damage award."''
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented.I 2 Chief Justice
Burger wrote a separate dissent in which he chastised the Court for tak-
ing the role of the legislature. "If 'affirmative action' programs such as
the one presented in this case are to be permitted, it is for Congress, not
this Court, to so direct."' 3 The Chief Justice pointed out that Congress
had only enacted a statute of such "extraordinary clarity" after con-
ducting "long study and searching debate."' 84 Yet, the Court operated
under the guise of "statutory construction" to rewrite Title VII to
achieve what the Court considers a desirable result. "[The Court]
'amends' the statute to do precisely what both its sponsors and its oppo-
nents agreed the statute was not intended to do."' 85 Justice Rehnquist
argued that the Court's opinion was ahead of its time. To emphasize
how the decision dramatically and unremarkably illustrated a switch in
the Court's interpretation of Title VII, he quoted an excerpt from George
Orwell's 1984.186 The passage spoke of how an official delivering a
speech had
unrolled and read it without pausing in his speech. Nothing altered in
his voice or manner, or in the content of what he was saying, but sud-
denly the names were different... The speaker had switched from one
line to the other actually in mid-sentence, not only without a pause, but
without even breaking the syntax.' 87
Justice Rehnquist found the Court's behavior as being much like the
Orwellian speaker, as if the Court had been handed a note that indicated
Title VII would lead to an unacceptable result if interpreted as it had
been in prior decisions. Thus, he argued without even a break in syntax,
the Court rejected "a literal construction of section 703(a) in favor of
newly discovered 'legislative history,' which leads to a conclusion di-
rectly contrary to that compelled by the 'uncontradicted legislative his-
tory' unearthed in McDonald and our other prior decisions.""8
Justice Rehnquist strongly argued that the statute should be literally
construed; and then if the statute is unclear, the legislative history should
be considered. He argued that Title VII prohibits race considerations in
181. Id. at 213.
182. Id. at 216 (Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 218.
184. Id. at 216.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 219-20.
187. Id. at 219 (citing G. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 181-82 (1949)).
188. Id. at 221.
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employment decisions "whether the race be black or white." ' 9 He con-
cluded by pointing out that the majority, "[by going not merely beyond,
but directly against Title VII's language and legislative history ... has
sown the wind. Later courts will face the impossible task of reaping the
whirlwind.'' "9
The outcome in Weber was surprising. Time honored rules of statu-
tory construction were ignored as the Court adopted a congressional pur-
pose at significant variance with the historical record. A far preferable
underpinning would have been a statute authorizing such remedial provi-
sions. While private voluntary solutions to questions of workplace dis-
crimination are desirable, here the color-blind principles of Title VII are
specifically repudiated.
The Weber fact pattern soon was replicated in the workplace of a pub-
lic employer. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 19' presented the issue of
whether a voluntary affirmative action plan by a public employer which
took into account the applicant's sex as a factor in promotions violated
Title VII. The Supreme Court, this time with a decisive 6-3 decision,
held that such a plan did not violate Title VII.
The confrontation stemmed from a county affirmative action plan
adopted in 1978 for the county transportation agency. The plan pro-
vided "that, in making promotions to positions within a traditionally seg-
regated job classification in which women have been significantly
underrepresented, the Agency is authorized to consider as one factor the
sex of a qualified applicant."' 92 Supervisors implemented the plan to ad-
dress the problem of underrepresentation of women in five job categories
based on a comparison to the county labor force. The plan's short-term
goal was to achieve "a statistically measurable yearly improvement in
hiring, training, and promotion"' 93 of women in the five categories; the
long-term goal being to match the work force in the Agency with the
area labor force.
In 1979, a promotional position opened for a road dispatcher. The
Agency classified this position as a Skilled Craft Worker; the Agency at
that time did not have any women in the designated classification. Diane
Joyce and Paul Johnson applied for the position along with ten other
county employees. Joyce had worked for the County since 1970; John-
son, since 1967. After the first interview, Johnson had tied for second
and Joyce was ranked third. Prior to the second interview, the Affirma-
tive Action Coordinator recommended to the Agency Director that
189. Id. at 220.
190. Id at 255.
191. 480 U. S. 616 (1987).
192. Id. at 620-21.
193. Id. at 621.
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Joyce be promoted in accordance with the plan. The panel conducting
the second interview recommended Johnson. The Agency Director, con-
sidering a combination of factors including the affirmative action plan,
promoted Joyce to the position.' 94
Johnson filed a complaint with the E.E.O.C. alleging denial of promo-
tion on the basis of sex. After receiving his right-to-sue letter, he filed
suit in the district court. The district court found that Joyce's sex was a
determining factor in promotion; and that since the plan was permanent,
the court held the plan invalid under Weber.19 The court of appeals
reversed, finding the consideration of sex lawful by the Agency.' 96
Upon plenary consideration, Justice Brennan wrote for the Supreme
Court. He evaluated two issues: (1) whether consideration of sex was
justified in light of the under-representation of women in "traditionally
segregated jobs"; and (2) whether the rights of male employees were un-
necessarily trammeled.
The Court found that the plan was designed to eliminate work force
imbalances within the Agency in traditionally segregated job categories;
and that the plan did not require the hiring of a woman over a man, but
rather, permitted sex as a factor to be considered in the selection process.
The Court also found that since no quotas had to be met, women still had
to compete with men for a job and therefore the plan did not "unnecessa-
rily tramm[el] the rights of other employees, [nor] creat[e] an absolute
bar to their advancement."' 97 Finally, the Court noted the importance
of the plan being a voluntary effort to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace.
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that the ma-
jority opinion in no way established "the permissible outer limits of vol-
untary programs undertaken by employers to benefit disadvantaged
groups."' 9 8 He began his opinion by noting that protected groups may
be benefitted by antidiscrimination measures in two distinct ways. First,
as a sword, antidiscrimination measures "may confer benefits by specify-
ing that a person's membership in a disadvantaged group must be a neu-
tral, irrelevant factor in governmental or private decisionmaking or,
alternatively, by compelling decisionmakers to give favorable considera-
tion to disadvantaged group status." 199
Second, as a shield, such a statute could also shield a member of a
protected class by assuring decisionmakers that, in some instances,
"when they elect for good reasons of their own to grant a preference of
194. Id.
195. Id. at 625.
196. 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985).
197. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
198. Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring).
199. Id.
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some sort to a minority citizen, they will not violate the law."2" Justice
Stevens further emphasized his conviction that employers should not be
forced to have had past discrimination in the workplace to ensure that
group preferences would not violate Title VII.
Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment, but disagreed with the "ex-
pansive and ill-defined approach to voluntary affirmative action"2 "1 taken
by the majority. In her view, the proper initial inquiry to make in evalu-
ating the legality of a public employer's affirmative action plan under
Title VII was no different from the inquiry required by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. In either scenario, the employer must have possessed "a
firm basis for believing that remedial action was required."2 "2 She con-
tinued by arguing that an employer would possess such a firm basis if it
could point "to a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie
claim under Title VII by the employee beneficiaries of the affirmative
action plan of a pattern or practice claim of discrimination."20 3 How-
ever, she disagreed with the dissenters that Weber should be overruled.
She noted that in Weber, the Court balanced the two conflicting concerns
that arise in construing section 703(d): "Congress' intent to route out
invidious discrimination against any person on the basis of race or gen-
der, (citation omitted) and its goal of eliminating the lasting effects of
discrimination against minorities."2 " As she read Weber, the Court also
determined that Congress had balanced the competing concerns by al-
lowing affirmative action only as a remedial device to eliminate actual or
apparent discrimination or the lingering effects of this discrimination. It
would be inconsistent with the background and purpose of Title VII to
prohibit affirmative action in every case.205
Justice White, dissenting, agreed with Justices Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist that Weber should be overruled. However, Justice White un-
derstood "traditionally segregated jobs" to be those dealing with blacks
and not the expansive view of any societal imbalance as used by the ma-
jority. He asserted that the Court interpreted Title VII to mean "nothing
more than a manifest imbalance between one identifiable group and an-
other in an employer's labor force." 2" This he argued was, as Justice
Scalia put it, a perversion of Title VII.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. "The
Court today completes the process of converting [Title VII] from a guar-
antee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment determina-
200. Id.
201. Id. at 648 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
202. Id. at 649.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
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tions, to a guarantee that it often will." Justice Scalia added that "the
only losers in the process are the Johnsons of the country, for whom Title
VII has been not merely repealed but actually inverted.""2 7 Scalia con-
cluded that because of this holding, personnel decisions will be made on
sex and not personal merit. Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the deci-
sion did more than just reaffirm Weber, and extend it to public actors.
The decision provided a threshold defense against Title VII liability
based on numerical disparities; in his opinion, this approach endorses an
illegal quota system.
Johnson strengthened the voluntary affirmative action model. In that
it affects public employers, the statutory analyses confirm that such a
plan is not sufficiently adverse to the male employee so as to offend the
outer constraints of the fourteenth amendment. Notwithstanding the
strident dissents, the workforce statistical imbalance aspect of the pre-
vailing opinions in the case provides the strongest justification to sustain
preferential hiring programs in law schools and other institutions of
higher education.20 8 Demographics of the workplace, showing fewer wo-
men or African Americans than in the available work force, allows an
employer to voluntarily engage in affirmative action to the detriment of
members of the majority. Thus, with no showing of particularized dis-
crimination, an employer may favor underrepresented classes of persons
in the selection process.
7. Principles Affecting Layoffs are Different: Individual Whites are
Identified
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education2 °9 presented the issue of
whether "a school board, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,
may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employ-
ees because of their race or national origin."21 The Supreme Court, by a
5-4 vote, held that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause.211
In 1972, a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was entered into be-
tween the Jackson, Michigan, Board of Education (Board) and the Jack-
207. Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. Buchanan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County: A Paradigm of Affirma-
tive Action, 26 Hous. L. REV. 229 (1989) (strongly defending the constitutional and policy wisdom
of the Johnson holding); Kandel, Johnson v. Transportation Agency: A Revival for Affirmative Action,
13 EMP. REL. L.J. 122 (1987) (Johnson protects women and minorities in competition for jobs in
employment systems which hire on individual merit); Note, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 65 U.
DET. L. REV. 861 (1988) (authored by Sherrill D. Wolford) (affirms approval of the principle of
affirmative action).
209. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). See also Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (race
conscious layoffs are not appropriate).
210. 476 U.S. at 269-70.
211. Id. at 269.
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son Education Association (union).2 12 The agreement contained a layoff
provision which stated "teachers with the most seniority in the district
shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage
of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority
personnel employed at the time of the layoff. '
213
During the 1976-77 and 1981-82 academic years, the Board, adhering
strictly to the CBA, laid off non-minority teachers while retaining minor-
ity teachers with less seniority.214 Wendy Wygant, a non-minority
teacher who was laid off, instituted an action alleging that the layoffs
were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. The dis-
trict court dismissed all claims, holding that prior discrimination need
not be found to grant racial preferences. The district court held that
such preferences were permissible "as an attempt to remedy societal dis-
crimination by providing 'role models' for minority school children. "215
The court of appeals affirmed.21 6 In the Supreme Court, petitioner Wy-
gant only sought review of the Equal Protection Clause claim.21 7
Justice Powell announced the judgment for the Court and opined that
an examination of classifications based on race consisted of two prongs:
(1) whether a compelling state interest existed, and (2) whether the
means of achieving the goal were narrowly tailored. 218 The district court
had held that the role model theory, based on societal discrimination,
was a compelling state interest to justify the racial preferences.21 9 Justice
Powell stated that in addition to societal discrimination, some prior ac-
tual discrimination must be shown before the state may use racial classifi-
cations to remedy the broader, more amorphous societal
discrimination.22° Justice Powell denounced the role model theory
mainly because it had no logical stopping point: "[tihe role model theory
allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices
long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose.",22 , He
further stated that such a plan would require year-to-year calibrations
which the Court earlier announced were unnecessary.222
Justice Powell maintained that the correct analysis was not a student
to teacher ratio, but rather a comparison of the "'racial composition of
[the school's] teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified
212. Id. at 270.
213. Id. at 270.
214. Id. at 272.
215. Id. at 272.
216. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
217. Wygant v. Jackson v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
218. Id. at 273.
219. See, Wygant, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
220. 476 U.S. at 275.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
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public school teacher population in the relevant labor market.' "223 He
stated that using a student-teacher ratio would be a step in the wrong
direction because a school system could justify a small number of Afri-
can American teachers by comparing the percentage to a small popula-
tion of African American students.224
Justice Powell announced that the reasonableness standard used by the
court of appeals was incorrect and that the Supreme Court had always
used more stringent standards. "[T]he means chosen to accomplish the
State's asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to ac-
complish that purpose. '' 22 ' He found that the layoffs were more disrup-
tive than hiring goals; and that since a less intrusive means of achieving
the same goal existed, the Board's layoff plan was not narrowly tai-
lored.226 Therefore, the layoff plan was violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
agreed with the strict standard announced by Justice Powell, but dis-
agreed with the need to have proven past discrimination: "The imposi-
tion of a requirement that public employers make findings that they have
engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action
programs would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet
voluntarily their civil rights obligations. ' 221 She argued that the Court's
result would be clearly at odds with the Court's and Congress's emphasis
on "the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law." 2 28
She contended that remedying past or present racial discrimination is a
sufficiently strong state interest to justify a carefully crafted affirmative
action plan. Additionally, Justice O'Connor maintained that such results
cannot be justified by a mere reference to the incremental value a con-
temporaneous findings requirement would have as an evidentiary safe-
guard. As depicted by the instant case, "public employers are trapped
between the competing hazards [of being liable] to minorities if affirma-
tive action is not taken to cure apparent employment discrimination and
[being liable] to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken. ', 229
Justice White concurred in the judgment.230 He argued that the Board
did not assert any interests, either singly or together, that justified the
racially discriminatory layoff policy and that would save it from the stric-
223. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (quoting Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).
224. Id. at 276.
225. Id. at 280.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
228. Id. (citing University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 364 (1978)).
229. Id. at 291 (emphasis in original).
230. Id.
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tures of the Equal Protection Clause.231 He could not believe that "in
order to integrate a work force, it would be permissible to discharge
whites and hire blacks until the latter comprised a suitable percentage of
the work force. '23 2 He noted that none of the Court's prior cases sug-
gest that this would be permitted under the Equal Protection Clause.233
Thus, he agreed with the plurality that the Board's policy was
unconstitutional.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun, dis-
sented.234 Justice Marshall believed that the layoffs were unfair, but, he
argued, unfairness should not be confused with constitutional injury.
"Paying no heed to the true circumstances of petitioner's plight, the plu-
rality would nullify years of negotiation and compromise designed to
solve serious educational problems in the public schools. ' 235 "A public
employer, with the full agreement of its employees, should be permitted
to preserve the benefits of a legitimate and constitutional affirmative-ac-
tion hiring plan even while reducing its work force., 236 The Board had
an important and legitimate purpose in agreeing with these lay-off provi-
sions. He did state, however, that further fact-finding was needed. In his
view, an attempt to resolve the constitutional issue either, as the plurality
had done, without any historical context whatsoever, or on the basis of a
record so devoid of established facts, was to do a grave injustice to not
only the Board and teachers involved, but also to the individuals and
governments [who are] committed to the goal of eliminating all traces of
segregation throughout the country.23 7
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent.23 ' In his opinion, it was not
necessary for the Court to find that the Board had been guilty of past
racial discrimination to support the conclusion that it had a legitimate
interest in employing in the future more African American teachers.239
He argued that instead of analyzing this type of case by inquiring as to
whether minority teachers "had some sort of special entitlement to jobs
as a remedy for sins [of] the past," the Court should first "ask whether
the Board's action advances the public interest in educating children for
the future."' 24  If so, Justice Stevens believed the Court should consider
"whether that public interest, and the manner in which it is pursued,
231. Id. at 295 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 296 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 312.
238. Id (Stevens, J. dissenting).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 313.
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justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged group."241
Justice Stevens concluded by stating that the Court should not lightly
approve governmental use of a race-based distinction.242 Although the
ultimate goal is to eliminate such irrelevant factors as a person's race
from decisionmaking, in the instant case, he was persuaded that the
Board's decision to include more black teachers served a valid purpose; it
was adopted with fair procedures; it was given a narrow breath.243 It was
"a step toward that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from govern-
mental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's
race."2 4  "The goal of providing 'role-models' discussed by the courts
below should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting
racial diversity among the faculty., 245 "[V]alid hiring goals, the burden
[of which] to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a considera-
ble extent among society generally .... Denial of a future employment
opportunity is not as intensive as loss of an existing job.'241
8. Summary
Preferential affirmative action hiring has, as the cases which have been
studied reflect, the support of a majority of the Supreme Court. The
Bakke Court recognized, in Justice Powell's opinion, that race could be a
factor in medical school admissions policies. This analysis supports the
special consideration being given to gender and other immutable charac-
teristics as well. Strict numerical quotas are unacceptable because they
posit the non-merit immutable characteristic as the controlling factor in
decisionmaking. Four members of the Court in Bakke set forth a stri-
dent approach to affirmative action that would seem to leave remedies
available only to specific victims of intentional discrimination. But
Bakke provides the legal justification for affirmative action admissions
and employment programs in higher education.
Weber and Johnson both encourage voluntary affirmative action plans.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 320.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 288 n. I (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
246. Id. at 282-83. (Marshall, J., dissenting). For scholarly commentary, see Kandel, The Limits
of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 12 EMPL. REL. L.J. 289, 305 (1986) (" Wygant is unsatisfy-
ing for EEO practitioners because it clouds rather than advances understanding of affirmative ac-
tion."); Pray, Wygant: Affirmative Action under the Equal Protection Clause, 16 STETSON L. REV.
915, 937 (1987) ("The Supreme Court clarified their analytic approach to affirmative action [plans]
under the Equal Protection Clause."); Note, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education: Affirmative
Action and the Innocent Party, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 519, 520 (1987) ("Wygant will not have a major
effect on affirmative action plans in general"); Note, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education: Are
Layoffs Appropriate in Affirmative Action? The Question Remains, 16 CAP. U.L. REv. 105, 118
(1986) ("[h]opefully, the Wygant decision will not deter public employers from implementing volun-
tary, appropriately tailored, remedial efforts to correct discriminatory abuses").
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Weber is a curious decision, endorsing race-conscious voluntary remedies
which adversely affect members of the majority. Johnson is closer kin to
Bakke by endorsing sex as a factor. As noted in several opinions of the
court, these voluntary programs include remedies which would be be-
yond the federal judicial power in that no specific victims of discrimina-
tion are identified. Wygant limits the federal judicial power when
identifiable whites are injured: in this case, by lay-off as a result of a plan
designed to increase racial diversity in the public school classroom.
The flip side of Wygant is more important in hiring decisions. Here
the court allows these broader objectives of ridding society of the rem-
nants of historical discrimination. These decisions support, at least
through the 1986 Wygant decision, current models of affirmative action
hiring policies in academia.
B. The New Models for Assessment of Affirmative Action
1. Overview
While the decisions discussed in the previous part of this article give
support to attempts to increase dramatically culturally diverse appoint-
ments to law faculties, four recent decisions of the Supreme Court cast an
ominous cloud over the continuing efficacy of such initiatives. It is im-
portant to note that none of these decisions specifically address the ques-
tion of appointments in higher education. But the tone is unmistakable.
The cases to be assessed are Martin v. Wilks,247 Wards Cove Packing
Company, Inc. v. Atonia,24 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins249 and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company.250 These cases addressed, respec-
tively, challenges to consent decrees to closed Title VII litigation by the
adversely-affected white employees not party to the original litigation;
burdens of proof in Title VII cases in two instances; and finally, local
government minority set-aside programs.
To appreciate the far-reaching significance of these decisions, attention
must be given to the actions of proponents of race- and gender-conscious
affirmative action following the court decisions. They have sought an
immediate response by the Congress to undercut the girdings of these
four decisions by amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964.251
247. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
248. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
249. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
250. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
251. H. Bill No. 4000 and S. Bill No. 2104. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is designed to overturn
the decisions which are discussed in this part. In the first session of the 101st Congress, Senate bill
1235 was introduced by Paul Simon (D. Ill.) to overturn Crson and House bills 3035, 3455 and
Senate bill 1261 were introduced by Floyd Flake (D. N.Y.), Tom Campbell (R. Ca.), and Howard
Metzenbaum (D. Ohio), respectively, to overturn Wards Cove.
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2. Martin v. Wilks: A New Approach to Upset Consent Decrees
Martin 212 set forth the question whether "white firefighters who had
failed to intervene in earlier employment discrimination proceedings in
which consent decrees were entered, could challenge employment deci-
sions taken pursuant to those decrees. '12 3 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, held that individuals not parties to the consent decrees could
challenge it on the grounds that the decree interfered with their rights
under both the Constitution and Title VII. z5 4
In 1974, seven black individuals and a local branch of the NAACP
filed separate class-action suits against the city of Birmingham, Alabama,
and the Jefferson County Personnel Board, alleging that both had en-
gaged in racially discriminating hiring and promotional practices in vari-
ous public service jobs in violation of Title VII and other federal laws.2 55
Consent decrees were eventually entered that included goals for hiring
blacks as firefighters and promoting them within the department.2 56
The Birmingham Firefighters Association (BFA) appeared at the fair-
ness hearing held concerning the consent decree and filed objections ami-
cus curiae.57 The BFA also moved to intervene on the ground that the
decrees would adversely affect their rights.25 The district court denied
the motions as untimely and approved the decrees.259 A group of white
firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then filed a complaint against the city
and the board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the de-
crees. 2" The complaint alleged that, because of their race they were be-
ing turned down for promotions in favor of less qualified blacks, which
was a violation of federal law.2 6 '
The board and the city admitted to making race conscious employ-
252. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). The history of the underlying Martin litigation
follows:
This case originated as Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Serbels, 13 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) ,504
(N.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1061 (1980). This was ultimately consolidated for trial with the Martin and Jefferson
County cases. The same counsel represented the Birmingham Firefighters Association (BFA) at
the fairness hearing and then represented the individual Martin litigants. All of the individual
litigants in Martin were members of the BFA at the time of the fairness hearing, allowing the
argument to be asserted by the city that the litigants in the reverse discrimination suit already
had their day in court. For support of the proposition, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976).
253. Martin, 490 U.S. at 758.
254. Id. at 762-63.
255. Id. at 755.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 759.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing United States v. Jefferson County, 28 FED. EMPL. PRAC. CASES 1834 (N.D. Ala.
1981)).
260. Id. at 760.
261. Id.
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ment decisions.26 2 A group of African American individuals, the Martin
petitioners, were allowed to intervene in their class representative capac-
ity to defend the decrees.2 63 The district court again denied relief and
both of these decisions were reversed on appeal.2M
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. He relied
primarily on interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
holding that the white firefighters could not be precluded from challeng-
ing a consent decree to which they were not parties.2 65 The Court relied
upon the principle set forth in Hansberry v. Lee26 that "one is not bound
by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as
a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of pro-
cess." '267 The Chief Justice maintained that one not privy to litigation
should be able to rest assured that his rights are protected and not shoul-
der the burden of "voluntary intervention"2 6 in a suit in which he is not
directly involved.2 69 The majority of the Court agreed that the burden of
joining parties lies with the one bringing the suit. Who better than they
to know who is necessary to properly litigate their case?27° Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for joining affected parties
in complex litigation affecting so many conflicting interests.271
The majority opinion would be unremarkable if rendered in any con-
text other than a civil rights or employment discrimination suit.2 72 But
here the consequences of consent decrees may subsequently preclude
such a method of resolving complex and sensitive matters of racial and
gender discrimination. How is one to resolve these matters? The Court
points to the provisions of the existing federal procedural rules. Perhaps
some specifics of class actions under Rule 23 could be used to bind par-
ties who are not personally appearing before the Court, but who appear
in some type of representative fashion.2 73 However, class actions,
262. Id
263. 1d.
264. 1d. at 760-61.
265. Id. at 763.
266. Id. at 761 (citing 311 U.S. 32 (1940)).
267. Id.(quoting 311 U.S. 32, 40).
268. Id. (citing Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 765.
271. Id. at 764-65.
272. Many commentators, before Martin, encouraged greater notice, involvement, and fairness
hearings to bind nonparties to affirmative action consent decrees: P. Glaser, MANAGEMENT OF
MASS TORT LITIGATION (1986); Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Right of Third Parties, 87 MiCH.
L. REV. 321 (1988); Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third
Parties, 1987 U. CI. LEGAL FOUND. 103 (1987); H. Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTIONS
(1977); Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of
Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887 (1984); B. Vanyo, SECURITIES LITiGATION
(1988).
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
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though, may have some of the same problems of the existing litigation
condemned in Martin. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have cur-
tailed the use of class actions by requiring use of sub-classes and provid-
ing detailed notice and an opportunity to "opt-out." '274
The dissenters took the majority to task for failing to consider the pro-
cedural difficulty which may be encountered by civil rights activists. 25
In addition, Justice Stevens's opinion distinguished between rights extin-
guished by the initial court decree and those rights which are burdened
by the decree; one's failure to join the suit limits one's action and the
right to appeal from a consent decree possibly adverse to one's inter-
est.27 6 Further, applying a balancing test, the dissenters suggested that in
any consent decree, some rights would be abridged in favor of another's.
Then, only a small number of white males would be adversely affected.277
The difference of opinion in the Court starts with differing philosophi-
cal orientations, with the dissenters seeking to ease the litigation burden
upon the minority members of society. These Justices are willing to im-
pose some of the burden of ending longer term societal discrimination
upon the members of the "innocent" majority who have been the benefi-
ciary of the discrimination.
Martin will no doubt limit the efficacy of consent decrees, a policy
which was supported by Congress in its enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; the establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and in the Supreme Court's support of voluntary affirm-
ative action plans discussed in an earlier part of this article.279 Contested
cases with an eventual judicial order will have to be more frequent: this
would not be such an insurmountable burden were it not for several
other decisions affecting burdens of proof which will be discussed
below.28 o
Creative use by plaintiffs of Rule 23 and the creation of defendant
classes will solve some of the problems inherent in affirmative action-
reverse discrimination litigation. Named groups of affected parties may
be identified by a class representative device, perhaps a union, or individ-
ually sued. In the specific context of the Martin litigation, it would not
be difficult to name and serve all current employees of the fire depart-
ment. Class representatives could then represent the interests of mem-
bers yet to be hired. Broad notice could be given under Rule 23. Careful
trial court management of parties required under Rule 19 or interests
274. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 769. (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. Id at 788.
277. Id.
278. See supra Part A6.
279. See infra Parts B3 and 4.
280. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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entitled to consideration under Rule 24 could avoid subsequent appellate
renewal.
These devices, which are apparently now compelled by the Martin de-
cision, will slow the likelihood of consent decrees. Adversial proceedings
will predominate with the myriad conflicting interests represented. How-
ever, creative use of Rules 19, 23, and 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will allow the principle of Martin to be overcome so that the
initial relief - probably less under the new burdens of proof discussed
below - binds all of the potentially affected parties.
3. Burdens of Proof: The Twins of Change
Wards Cove and Hopkins likely will have a greater impact upon Title
VII law than Martin. The dilemma of Martin makes litigation more
complex, but it can be remedied. Wards Cove seems to overturn a score
of years of case law in a single deft blow: case law which can be only
recaptured through congressional action.
The facts of Wards Cove are unique, but the impact of the majority's
opinion will be general and far-reaching. The employment practices of
two employers operating salmon canneries in remote Alaska were
presented.281 At issue were jobs of two general types: unskilled "can-
nery jobs" and mostly skilled "noncannery jobs. ' 2 2 Cannery jobs were
filled with Filipinos and Native Alaskans. The Filipinos were hired
through a union hiring hall agreement while native Alaskans were hired
from villages near the canneries.2" 3 By contrast, noncannery jobs were
filled primarily with Caucasians from company offices in Oregon and
Washington.28 4 While at the same job site, noncannery workers were
paid better than cannery workers and the White noncannery workers
lived in separate residence halls and ate in separate mess halls from the
non-White cannery workers.
Claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact 2 5 were advanced.
The federal district court rejected all claims based upon disparate treat-
ment 28 6 and found that while the disparate impact claims were colorable,
they too failed for want of proof.2 7 Upon appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, an appellate panel initially affirmed, but the
en banc court held that subjective hiring practices such as alleged in
Wards Cove could be analyzed under a disparate impact analysis.288 This
281. Id. at 646.
282. Id. at 647.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 648.
285. Id. at 648.
286. 703 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1983).
287. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d. 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
288. 703 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988).
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circuit opinion preceded the Supreme Court's opinion in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust Co.,289 which merged some of the proof proce-
dures involving evidence of subjective behavior.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that once the prima facie claim of dispa-
rate impact had been shown by the plaintiffs, the burden then shifted to
the employer to prove the business necessity of its practice. 2" No appel-
late panel or en banc opinion challenged the district court's conclusions
concerning the disparate treatment claims initially plead. Thus, the spe-
cific intent to discriminate claims were not further pursued.
The Supreme Court noted that the appellate court had analyzed the
legitimacy of the disparate impact claim by comparing the respective
number of whites and minorities in the cannery and noncannery posi-
tions.29' This was an attractive approach and emotionally compelling,
but no records were available which compared the pool of job applicants
or the population of minorities in the labor force qualified for the cannery
positions.2 92 The emotionally satisfying comparison which had been
made by the appellate court did not reflect any information as to the
possible available workforce: there was no information showing whether
the employers discriminated in the context of the qualified pool. The
lower court approach was criticized as both being overly-broad and
overly-narrow at the same time, depending upon how one posed the
question of the appropriate measuring rod.293
The parts of the Court's opinion excerpted above created significant
problems for persons litigating questions of employment discrimination
as shown, but the coup de grace came as the Court opined in dicta the
procedures the lower courts were to employ upon remand.294 "[T]he
plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need
to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer's workforce.
The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice
that is challenged [as having the allegedly discriminatory effect]."2 9 The
Court continued: "[e]ven if on remand respondents can show that non-
whites are underrepresented in the at-issue jobs in a manner that is ac-
ceptable under the standards set forth in Part II ... this alone will not
suffice to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.
296
While this procedure may be burdensome, liberal tools of discovery
will aid prospective plaintiffs in isolating the employment practice which
289. 863 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1988).
290. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1982).
291. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1988).
292. Id. at 658.
293. Id. at 654.
294. Id. at 656 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988)).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 657.
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allegedly causes the discriminatory practice. Once the plaintiffs identify
the specific employment practice which has the discriminatory effect and
present the statistical data from the relevant work forces, then, and only
then, is the employer required to present its business necessity defense.2 97
In considering the employer's asserted business necessity justification,
there is no requirement that the practice be "essential" or "indispensa-
ble." '98 The employer merely is required to carry the burden of produc-
tion, not the burden of persuasion, which always remains with the
plaintiff. 99 If the employer meets its burden of production, then the
plaintiff may still prevail by persuading "the fact finder that 'other tests
or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would
also servie the employer's legitimate [hiring] interest[s]; by so demon-
strating, [the plaintiffs] would prove that [petitioners were] using [their]
tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." 3" Alternative business
practices with less disparate impact presented by plaintiffs should be
adopted gingerly by the federal judiciary. As a practical matter, the em-
ployer's selection processes which are not designed to intentionally dis-
criminate will be sustained if not violative of the disparate impact theory.
The four Justices who dissented from the majority's holding believed
that the majority's approach to the appropriate work force/pool statistics
was unduly narrow. Given the narrow and unique nature of the em-
ployer's work in remote Alaska, the dissenters believed that the racial
classification between the two job categories should be "treated as a sig-
nificant element of the [plaintiff's] prima facie case. ' '  The dissenters
then recounted the history of disparate impact litigation for a score of
years, sadly noting that the fair rules of the shifting burdens of proof-
adopted over years of litigation-were changed in a fashion which made
a plaintiff's task nearly impossible." 2 The "plantation" setting of the
salmon canning industry may be likened to the slave days.30 3 "[O]ne
wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination -
or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a prob-
lem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.""
Wards Cove is a wholesale retreat from basic principles of Title VII
disparate impact law. Its shifting rules regarding the employer's burdens
during litigation undercut basic rules of evidence which place the burden
297. Id. at 658.
298. Id. at 659.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 660 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 662.
303. Id. (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall JJ., dissenting).
304. Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
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of producing evidence in a trial in the hands of the party having superior
access.
A less damaging procedural and evidentiary case is next considered.30 s
Hopkins presented an interesting alignment of Supreme Court justices.
Justice Brennan, usually relegated to strident dissent in this year's em-
ployment discrimination marathon, announced the judgment of the
Court in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.3 6 Jus-
tices White and O'Connor concurred in the judgment; 37 and Justices
Kennedy and Scalia and the Chief Justice dissented.3"'
Hopkins had been denied her partnership with the Price Waterhouse
accounting firm. She alleged the denial was premised upon sex discrimi-
nation, resulting from male partners' sexual stereotyping of appropriate
characteristics of women partners;30 9 the employer argued that its deci-
sion to deny partnership would have been made regardless of any possi-
ble sex discrimination, thus, it had a legitimate basis for the personnel
action.31" This mixed motive case was accepted by the Supreme Court to
consider the appropriate standard of proof by which the employer had to
prove that it would have made the same decision without the illegal sex-
based factor.3" The district court in Hopkins required a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard; the court of appeals reversed with instructions
to consider the matter under a preponderance of evidence standard.31 2
The majority and separate concurring opinions of the Supreme Court
Justices differ upon the nature of the evidence which the employer must
submit. The majority seemed to require some objective evidence; Justice
White stated that "[if] the employer credibly testifies that the action
would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be
ample proof. ' 313 Justice O'Connor opined that the plaintiff must show
that the unlawful basis was a substantial part of the employer's decision-
making processes.31 4 The dissenters reviewed the plurality's pronounce-
ments and concluded that Hopkins could not prevail in this litigation
305. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 258 (White, O'Connor, JJ. concurring).
308. Id. at 279 (Kennedy and Scalia, J1. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 232-34.
310. Id.
311. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 236-37. The Supreme Court has considered similar mixed motive
cases in the union setting, NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (the so-called
Wright Line cases) and in a constitutional setting in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt Healthy, the Supreme Court opined that if the constitutionally
or statutorily protected behavior had played a "substantive part" in the making of the employment
decision, that the decision would be unlawful. Mt Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284.
312. 263 U.S. App. D.C. 321, 825 F.2d 458 (1987).
313. 490 U.S. at 261-62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
314. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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based on the district court's factfinding.31 5
The agreement in the Supreme Court upon the preponderance of evi-
dence standard is not the most troublesome part of this opinion. Rather
it is the consensus which emerges from the combined opinions of all Jus-
tices other than the plurality which indicates how easy it is for the em-
ployer to prevail when several motives may be articulated. Earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the appellate courts had given
hope that decisions which smacked of racial or gender discrimination
would be rejected; here, such decisions may be rectified if the employer is
able to articulate arguably legitimate grounds, however ilimsy.
4. Local Minority Set-Aside Programs: No Dice
Programs providing for special minority set-asides in public works
procurement programs came before the Supreme Court in a case which
involved such a preferential program adopted by the City of Richmond,
Virginia. The local ordinance provided that a certain percentage of gov-
ernmental contracts had to be awarded to minority entrepreneurs. In
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,316 a losing bidder challenged the
city ordinance as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The trial court determined that the remedial nature
of the city program was constitutional in light of the factual record
which established that a city with one-half African American population
gave less than one percent of its prime contracts to minority entrepre-
neurs. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed3" 7 the dis-
trict court under the authority of Wygant.31 8
When argued to the Supreme Court, consideration of the Court's prior
approval of a congressionally-authorized race-conscious set-aside pro-
gram had to be considered. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,3" 9 the Court had
sustained the federal program against fifth and fourteenth amendment
challenges. The Court found that Congress had the right to try tempo-
rary, experimental programs to remedy what Congress perceived to be a
social and economic problem directly attributable to violations of the
Constitution. In contrast, the Richmond program was invalidated be-
cause the city had no documented and specific evidence of invidious dis-
crimination; the program was not sufficiently narrow in its scope to avoid
strict scrutiny; and a number of the benefitted groups (such as Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts) did not have a history of discrimination at
the hands of the City of Richmond.320 Local or state government set-
315. Id. at 294-95 (Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
316. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
317. 882 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987).
318. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
319. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
320. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. Several recent law review articles and comments may shed light
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aside programs appear to be doomed by the decision. The evidentiary
burden upon a local or state legislature in enacting such remedial pro-
grams is so high as to make it unlikely that a legislature assembly will
adopt such a measure.
In contrast to the more ambiguous impact of generalized hiring goals,
the Court analyzed the Croson case under the rubric of Wygant which
focused upon identified victims: in Wygant, whites were discharged
rather than more recently hired minorities; in Croson, a specifically iden-
tified majority public works bidder lost to a less competitive minority
vendor.32' Croson is in harmony with the Martin decision by allowing
for the post hoc protection of the majority from whatever limited prefer-
ential treatment is made available to minorities. But the Croson decision
cannot be mended without congressional action, while Martin can be
overcome as outlined above.
5. The Impact of These Decisions
The impact of these decisions and others, such as Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union,3 22 a case involving an interpretation of a related employ-
ment discrimination statute,323 has yet to be realized. In the wake of
these opinions, the Supreme Court promptly vacated judgments and re-
manded cases in which certiorari had been granted: Swint et aL v. Pull-
man-Standard;324 H.K. Porter Co. v. Dade County, Florida;325 USX
Corp. v. Green ;326 and Consolidated City of Jacksonville v. Nash.327  In
on Croson. For an article generally critical of the Croson decision, see Rosenfeld, Decoding Rich-
mond. Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1729 (1989) (the Supreme Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test for weighing the constitutional-
ity of race-conscious remedial measures in state and local legislation). For an interesting account,
see Russ, The Richmond Narrative, 68 TEX. L. REV. 31 (1989). ("[Tlhe Court has erected an imped-
iment that will save only to hinder our striving to 'get beyond racism' "). Note, An Analysis of the
New Legal Model for Establishing Set-Aside Programs for Minority Business Enterprise. The Case of
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 25 GONZ. L. REV. 141, 155 (1989)(while commending the
Supreme Court for its decision, this student author notes "[A]n institution lacking federal compe-
tence, which desires to address a racial imbalance within its own 'bailiwick,' but is unable to point to
specific acts of past discrimination, must resort to alternative nonpreferential affirmative action ef-
forts"). See also, Note, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection Benign Classifications Based on Race
Must be Narrowly Tailored to Achieve a Compelling Governmental Interest, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493
(1989). Comment, Affirmative Action Minority Set-Asides: Future Justification for Implementation
at the State and/or Local Government Level, 59 Miss. L.J. 189, 205 (1989). Comment, Race-Based
Remedial Legislation and the Appropriate Standard of Review, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 63 (1989).
321. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). See also Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989),
holding that the recovery of attorneys fees by women and minorities against "reverse discrimina-
tion" plaintiffs was not available.
322. 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
323. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
324. 490 U.S. 1103 (1989) (vacated and remanded in light of Wards Cove).
325. 489 U.S. 1062 (1989) (vacated and remanded in light ofJA. Croson Co.).
326. 490 U.S. 1103 (1989) (vacated and remanded in light of Wards Cove).
327. Id.
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one case, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower court decision
which had invalidated a state set-aside program which had failed to make
specific findings of intentional discrimination by the governmental
unit.328
Lower courts have interpreted these decisions in a variety of circum-
stances, including: Wards Cove does not apply to voluntary contracts;
3 29
Croson proposes that laws applicable to the preservation of African
American rights apply equally to whites; 30 local set-aside program are
enjoined under the authority of Croson;33' Wards Cove does not permit
the introduction of new proof to invalidate a fourteen year old finding of
discrimination;3 32 word of mouth referral system which was found by the
Court to be unlawful was not being revisited as a result of Wards Cove;
33 3
a DEA case fails because statistical proof of one subgroup did not satisfy
Wards Cove analysis;334 Wards Cove results in employer victory in chal-
lenge to fetal protection policy;335Martin does not require the opening of
a consent decree where no African Americans were working for em-
ployer when decree entered; 336 Martin compels conclusion that White
officers may challenge implementation of a consent decree where 1:1 Af-
rican American and white hiring ratio was mandated; 337 and subjective
interviewing practice which resulted in a statistical disparity of hiring
African American and white is a sufficiently identified employment prac-
tice to survive a Wards Cove analyses.3
In a word, these decisions call into question the basic principles that
have informed affirmative action practices in the United States for a score
of years. They compel a sobering reassessment of new approaches one
might utilize to employ more (or continue to employ more) culturally
diverse faculty in an institution of higher education. A bias in favor of
the employer is present in these cases; a tilt in favor of the view that
racial and gender discrimination is a thing of the past permeates; and a
tilt in favor of challenges to programs which hurt identifiable whites is
presented. Thus, the clarion call is for a new approach which will con-
328. Michigan Road Builders Ass'n., v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S.
1061 (1981).
329. United States v. City of Miami, 52 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) ,625 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
330. Triad Assocs. v. Chicago Housing Authority, 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied,
Ill S. Ct. 129 (1990).
331. Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, Florida, 723 F. Supp. 669 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
332. Sledge v. J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 52 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) ,537 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
333. E.E.O.C. v. Andrew Corp., 51 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) ,364 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
334. Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d. 1364 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
I10 S. Ct. 1470 (1990).
335. UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
336. Henry v. Gadsen, 40 FED. EMPL. PRAC. CAsEs 292 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
337. Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1989).
338. Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied, II1 S. Ct. 53 (1990).
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tinue to encourage cultural diversity while withstanding constitutional
and statutory invalidation.
C. The Hiring Practices: The Chase
1. The Current Practices
Few accounts exist of the hiring practices of law schools. As two au-
thors have noted, this is curious, in light of the fundamental and critical
role one's colleagues play in the activities of a law school and in its ability
to carry out its training mission. 339
Bruce and Swygert outline institutional processes which can identify
some positions early in a school year for the future-through anticipated
resignations, new positions, colleagues on visitorships, and the like - but
concludes that many needed slots are unknown until much later in the
year."4 The authors discuss the role of the recruitment processes of the
American Association of Law Schools,34 the rituals of "good 'ole boy"
referrals, the campus interview, and the varying levels of decisionmaking
within the law school itself. 42 But especially important for our consider-
ation are the criteria which are used to select candidates.343
The consensus among law schools supports the view that the prestige
of the law school attended and one's rank at that school are the two most
salient features considered in the selections process. 3 ' A surprisingly
small number of law schools are the feeder schools within this system. 345
Advanced graduate degrees in the law are considered as a means to im-
prove the pedigree of a less desirable law school where a potential teacher
has obtained his or her Juris Doctor degree.346 Law review and publica-
tion experience is highly valued. 347 Law teaching experience at an appro-
priate law school will be considered. 34  A judicial clerkship will be
rewarded.349 Of course, on occasion, specialized course needs may dic-
339. See Bruce & Swygert, The Law Faculty Hiring Process, 18 Hous. L. REV. 215 (1981) (quot-
ing Editorial, A Reflection on the Lighthouse, 27 J. LEGAL EDUc. 377 (1975)). See also Prosser,
Advice to the Lovelorn, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1951).
340. Bruce and Swygert, supra note 338.
341. Id. at 230-35.
342. Id. at 235-42.
343. Id. at 243-59.
344. Id. at 243-44. See also Lee, Ten Faculty Candidates: Which Two Would You Choose for
Your School? - LEARNING & L. 22 (Spring 1974); Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC.
257 (1948).
345. Bruce & Swygert, supra note 338, at 243 n.150. The top five schools include: Harvard,
Yale, Columbia, Michigan, and Chicago; the next 15 include N.Y.U., Georgetown, Texas, Virginia,
Berkeley, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Stanford, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Cornell,
Duke, and George Washington.
346. Id. at 244-46.
347. Id. at 248.
348. Id. at 248-50.
349. Id. at 251.
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tate that someone with specific experience and knowledge about a dis-
crete area of the law - such as tax - may be hired outside of the
traditional settings.35 ° Some clinical appointments will give greater
weight to practice experiences.35'
The irony of this system of selection is that it is unlikely to pass any
kind of job validation study which Title VII requires of employers -
with the caveat that the impact of the Court's decisions noted above can-
not be fathomed with any certainty.3 52 Using the outline developed
above, the ideal law school faculty applicant would:
* Attend one of 20 schools of law and perform in the top of his or her
class;
* Be an editor of the law review; and
* Serve a judicial clerkship - preferably on a federal court of appeals or
the Supreme Court.
2. An Assessment of the Current Practices
This pool of attractive candidates is relatively small and certainly does
not meet the needs for faculty hiring. Thus far, we have dared not in-
quire as to whether any of these characteristics make the slightest differ-
ence when hiring law faculty. Do we ask whether the perspective teacher
can teach? Do we require any knowledge about teaching? Do we require
any understanding of ethics? Do we require any information about one's
ability to be a lawyer - or to understand the demands of daily legal prac-
tice? Do we have any information concerning one's willingness to work
with colleagues or students? To do counseling? A myriad of questions
are posed which suggest that the hiring rules for law schools are only
vaguely related to the actual activity of law school teaching.
On the plus side, the currently favored criteria give good indication
that one might be a clone of an existing law school faculty member; or
that one might be a good editor of another's work or perhaps, (but not
certainly) a good writer in one's own right; or have good contacts with a
small cadre of other legal educators and a particular judge and his or her
colleagues.
It is surprising that so little thought has been given to what legal edu-
cators actually do - and then to pose questions to applicants about those
matters. 353 Law schools tend to emulate the so-called leaders in legal
350. Id. at 250-53.
351. Id. at 250 n.194.
352. See supra Part B. "And there is little, if any, evidence available to determine whether we
would do as well or better if alternative criteria were used in selecting law teachers." Laurence,
Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schoolt" The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 434
n.13 (1986).
353. See supra Part D. Notwithstanding the practices of law schools in the recruitment process,
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education. And notwithstanding the relatively fungible elitist credentials
of law school faculty, today's vogue is to identify ad hoc, cultural diver-
sity per se as a desirable goal. With this goal the author concurs, but the
methodology of imposing such a quasi-quota system demeans all appli-
cants: applicants are hired because of their cultural diversity and then,
when a desirable number is reached, the job of cultural diversity is com-
pleted. The randomness of the appointments process does not begin to
qualify as a job-validated approach required by federal regulations.354
Ironically, law school faculties commend themselves upon their diver-
sity - or at least diversity as they define it. Southerners and Northerners
are on a single faculty (occasionally); Jews and Gentiles; Democrats and
Republicans;3 5 but only occasionally do we have women, Blacks, His-
panics, Native Americans; 356 and even less occasionally do we have
avowed gays and Lesbians.357 But the intellectual diversity which is al-
leged to exist is only diversity at a very limited level. The broader Amer-
ican populace believes that law faculty belief systems generally are at
variance with the general population. The academy has set itself upon a
course which seems to members of the academy to be just and "correct":
the vogue of the then existing, "politically correct" position. Missing, of
course, is the economic class integration which might make a faculty
truly diverse.
3. The Activities of the Law Schools' Constables: The American
Association of Law Schools and the American Bar
Association
The American Association of Law Schools (AALS) has for some time
the aspirational goals of one midwestern law school show the following policies as its hiring qualifi-
cation standards:
a. Demonstrated achievement in or potential to achieve quality teaching.
b. Meaningful work experience.
c. Completion of advanced degrees in Law or other disciplines in addition to the required
degree.
d. Distinguished record in academic programs related to the position to be filled.
e. Compatibility with small town environment.
f. Diversity of gender, race and ethnic background represented on the faculty.
g. Personality and demeanor which suggest that the candidate will be accessible to and ap-
proachable by our students.
h. Diversity of educational institutions represented on the faculty.
i. Publications, editorships, membership on committees, commissions or boards.
j. Recognition of the moral, ethical and religious values embodied in the purposes and goals of
the University.
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY FACULTY BYLAWS - PERSONNEL STANDARDS
§ IIA (1988).
354. See Bryden, On Race and Diversity, 6 CoNsT. COMMENT. 383 (1987).
355. Id.
356. See infra text accompanying notes 365-66.
357. See Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race," 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1979).
42
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1991], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol19/iss2/7
ENHANCED CULTURAL DIVERSITY
championed the employment of a more diverse faculty."' 8 The Special
Committee on Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Teachers
(Special Committee), in its March 24, 1988, report" 9 defined the affected
class of minorities as "Blacks, Hispanics (including Mexican-Americans,
Puerto Ricans, Cuban-Americans, and others of Spanish origins), Asians
and Pacific. Islanders, and Native-Americans.""aW "The working defini-
tion of 'minorities' is not necessarily intended to be close-ended." 6 '
The Special Committee considered a number of special approaches to
enhance minority hiring:
* A study to identify the pool of potential minority applicants 362
* Expanding the stream of candidates: more focused advertising of va-
cancies, use of minority alumni to recruit, scheduling of CLE pro-
grams involving minority graduates; adjunct responsibilities; hiring of
promising minority students as research assistants, use of minority
legal organizations, reservation of slots for minority applicants;
faculty and practitioner exchanges; loan forgiveness programs, and
several other programs.
363
The Special Committee then considered problems of retention, 3" and
quality of life issues for minorities in legal education.3 65 The recommen-
dations of the AALS, however well intended, run afoul in many respects
of the recent pronouncements concerning affirmative action of the
Supreme Court. The Association's reliance upon the protection afforded
to "voluntary" plans which adversely affect the cultural majority is in-
creasingly suspect when set against the principles enunciated by the
emerging staple majority of the Supreme Court. The inevitable demise of
traditional voluntary affirmative action plans should not be viewed with
gloom. This circumstance should compel the academy to rethink and
rearticulate more clearly standards for appointment. The new standards
will appropriately take into account the cultural diversity of our nation
and will develop criteria which will as accurately as possible tailor both
curricular needs and predict success on a law school faculty. Rather
than lament such a mission, law faculties should welcome it.
358. For example, the AALS filed an amicus brief in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). For
a discussion of Sweatt v. Painter, see supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
359. Association of American Law Schools, Report of the AALS Special Committee on Recruit-
ment and Retention of Minority Law Teachers (1988), redistributed to Deans of Member Schools
and Associate Deans for Academic Affairs, Memorandum Deans 89-201 from Betsy Levine, Execu-
tive Director (March 31, 1989).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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4. The Current Data Suggest that Culturally Diverse Hiring is
Floundering
The Association's concern for special efforts to recruit a culturally di-
verse faculty is further strengthened by an assessment of the numbers of
such persons in legal education. A recent AALS annual meeting presen-
tation included the following detailed demographic information:
" Blacks in the legal profession
1890 431 .48%
1970 3,406 1.29%
1989 24,038 3.4%
" Minority Law Student Enrollment in Law Schools
BLACK MEXICAN ASIAN
1977-78 5,304 (4.9%) 1,564 (1.5%) 1,382 (1.2%)
1988-89 6,321 (5.2%) 1,657 (1.3%) 3,133 (2.5%)
[Essentially stable in all categories except for an increase in Asian
Americans]
* Minorities Accepting Academic Positions
1977 4.1%
1986 2.5%
Present Overall Minority Faculty .7%366
In the 1989-90 AALS Faculty Appointments Register, 698 registrants
were noted. Of these, 201 or 28% were female, 1 was a Native American
male; 28 were Black (11 male; 17 female) and 11 were Hispanic (7 male;
4 female).36 7 These numbers suggest that even extraordinary efforts to
recruit persons of cultural diversity from traditional sources will be
inadequate.
As the Association's Special Committee has noted, new doors must be
opened. The University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin at Madison, and Stanford University law schools
have all undertaken dramatic initiatives to increase their number of cul-
tural diverse faculty with success. These "successes" have used some
variations from the traditional "ideal" candidate profile outline above,
but this author contends that the traditional qualifications does little to
mirror the reality of the job requirements for successful law school
teaching.
366. R. Clayton, Promoting and Nurturing Academic Values of Faculty Diversity, AALS
Program, San Francisco, California (January 5, 1990) (Hand-out).
367. Data collected by D. Benson, Ohio Northern University College of Law from Register,
presented at Faculty Discussion Group on April 23, 1990.
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D. The Qualification Factors Approach
1. The General View
The description of a more comprehensive set of criteria for appoint-
ment as a member of the law faculty is occasioned by several principles
and by the author's experiences on a university-wide committee at a
small midwestern school. First, decisions which purposefully discrimi-
nate, for whatever commendable motivation should be suspect in the
academy. Thus, the determination to create a minority or women's slot
for a particular appointment seems remiss in principle. The fact that
several accrediting law school bodies might endorse such an approach is
of interest, but does little to save the practice if it is arguably defective in
fact. If cultural diversity is desirable, which I believe strongly it is, then
principled approaches should be developed to justify, support, and imple-
ment such a course of action.
Any type of affirmative action program that looks like a numbers-
crunching exercise is viewed as suspect by all affected constituencies: the
applicant, one's colleagues, and the students. The applicant resents his
or her special treatment as a "minority"; colleagues grumble about a slot
being a "women's slot" or a "Black slot"; and students may perceive
employing a Black or female faculty member with less outstanding cre-
dentials than a mythical "White male" faculty applicant as affirmative
action.
Here, is an opportunity to weave objectives of cultural diversity into
the basic job description, and to make cultural diversity a desirable end
in and of itself as a matter of basic qualification for a position. This
approach, would enable a college of law to state with confidence that the
most qualified applicant under the personnel guidelines has been hired to
fill a particular position. By making cultural diversity an official ingredi-
ent of job qualifications, we test the limits of our academic commitment
to diversity in higher education in the late Twentieth Century.
How important it is to have the perspective of culturally diverse per-
sons in a particular position would guide our recruitment efforts - and
might aid our recruitment efforts when applicants of diverse backgrounds
considered the genuine commitment evidenced by a law school to attract
such diversity.
Job validation tests have long been considered as one acceptable way
to achieve the desired blend of cultural diversity in the appointments;
criteria have tended to create a nondiverse workforce.368 Here the stan-
368. "We have not imposed upon law schools the same obligations we place upon police depart-
ments, fire departments, or even elementary and high school systems to demonstrate that the qualifi-
cations they have established are job-related." H. Glickstein, Law Schools: Where the Elite Meet to
Teach, 10 NOVA L.J. 541, 541-42 (1986).
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dards which have been employed to hire members of law school faculties
have tended to produce a predominately White work force; this fact
should shift the burden to the employer to justify the employment prac-
tices necessitating that cultural composition. As has been suggested pre-
viously in this article, law school hiring standards seem so muddy as to
be unable to withstand scrutiny of any serious sort.3 69
Thus, vacant faculty positions should be carefully assessed by a com-
mittee of the faculty, with the active participation of the dean or the
dean's designee, to create a job description that mirrors the school's
needs at the time the position is being advertised. This would, of course,
allow a different job description for a subsequent hiring should institu-
tional needs change.
This approach builds upon Bakke and Johnson which allow cultural
diversity to be considered in the employment decision-making process.
Its novelty is to take the next step of truly writing a job description which
mirrors actual need.
2. An Illustrative Job Vacancy Announcement
VACANCY - JOB DESCRIPTION - QUALIFICATIONS
1. In filling each vacancy within the law school, the appointments com-
mittee shall, with the cooperation and assistance of the dean, prepare
a job description for the vacant position. Recruitment for a specific
position shall not be undertaken until the dean approves the job de-
scription and it is subsequently approved by the University Person-
nel Standards Committee.
2. Job descriptions shall completely assess the qualifications required
for a particular appointment. Factors to be considered, with each
factor evaluated as shown below, should include:
A. Demonstrate substantive knowledge in the field to be taught. (20
points)
[Factors to be considered: actual degrees earned; specific training in
field; actual academic performance in major field.]
B. Actual or Potential for Scholarly Research. (10 points)
[Factors to be considered: review of published works (including stu-
dent works), areas of research interest.]
C. Cultural Diversity. (20 points)
[Representation in group defined as a "need group" (reflecting un-
derrepresentation in terms of relative racial/gender distribution in
workforce).]
D. Demonstrate experience and interest in collegial activities and com-
munity/civic affairs. (10 points)
369. See supra Part D2.
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[Factors to be considered: Prior associational activities, work on
committees and group activities in the community.]
E. Demeanor and Personality for Effective Student Counseling and In-
teraction. (20 points)
F. Work Load Production. (10 points)
[Factors to be considered: teaching assistantships, previous full or
part-time employment and responsibilities associated therewith.]
G. Compatibility with the Institution. (10 points)
[Factors to be Considered: Environmental background indicating
temporary or permanent, interest in living in small town; compati-
bility with moral, ethical and religious values of the institution; tol-
erance of divergent value systems.]
3. The University Personnel Standards Committee is established to as-
sist in the development of job description and appropriate and valid
job qualifications.
E. The Implementation of the Program and Other Recommendations
Cultural diversity is more imperative than it has ever been. New ap-
proaches are needed to ensure that the institutions of higher education,
and particularly the schools of law from which come the leaders of our
society - are truly populated by faculty which represents the diverse
cultural heritages of our Nation. The proposals which are contained in
this article which of course are of general application might be imple-
mented by a college of law along the following lines:
Assume a vacancy in teaching property, land use planning, civil rights,
and municipal corporations. Here identified, for illustrative purposes
only, are two fields: property and perhaps municipal corporations/con-
stitutional law.
In evaluating factor 1, one would look at the existence of the J.D. de-
gree, performance in law school in the subject courses; and any addi-
tional specific training in these fields. Assuming grades of A in all
affected classes, a J.D. from a creditable institution, and work with a law
firm involved in land use/zoning litigation, such an applicant might be
evaluated in the 8-10 range.
Under factor 2, student papers, law journal articles, law subject matter
newsletters and the like would be assessed. Also, in this applicant's case,
appellate briefs or other pleadings, might be appropriate. A student note
and three appellate briefs of exceptionally good quality might result in a
6-8 rating.
Under factor 3, cultural diversity would be assessed. In law, represen-
tation by Blacks, Hispanics, and to a lesser extent, women, is inadequate.
Thus, a Black woman applicant might be evaluated from 9-10 on this
scale. Some persons who have commented upon this hiring system rec-
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ommend that this factor be given greater weight than 10. The relative
ranking of these factors is tricky: it is easily susceptible to abuse in favor-
ing or discouraging such appointments.
Under factor 4, experience of the applicant in working with commu-
nity or professional group and the like would be assessed. This would
give an indication of committee work. Our applicant was with one bar
committee on a pro bono basis, and serves as the treasurer of her neigh-
borhood civic association. She might be evaluated 5-7 on this factor.
Factor 5 would be subjective in many ways, but comments from em-
ployers or previous supervisors might be helpful. Here, the applicant
was viewed as a nurturing personality. She might receive an 8-9 on this
factor. Work load productivity would be easily assessed in the context
of a law firm associate, with a high number (9-10) likely being assigned.
To be pursued would be the question of subtracting from that number
because the applicant wanted a more "laid back" lifestyle.
Finally, the environmental and ethical compatibility factor would be
pondered. Prior specific experiences of attending a college in a small
community with a church affiliation might give some evidence of com-
patibility. However, as cultural diversity is sought above, diversity in
background experiences may also be appropriate here. Our applicant at-
tended a small church-affiliated institution in Indiana and a large urban
law school. She is active in church social affairs. She might receive an
evaluation of 8-9 on this category.
This is but a possible scenario to unfold. Others are certain to exist.
This recruitment plan would likely withstand constitutional attack in
that the factors of cultural diversity are integrated and woven into a
broad plan of appointments; the numbers are tentative and subject to
rethinking; and the plan represents a proposal which considers in a broad
context, the institutional employer needs.
But this is but the first step. Once a diverse faculty is engaged, efforts
at retention begin. Persons of cultural background of other than the ma-
jority cannot be tokens, subject to serving all students of a similar cul-
ture, or explaining the culture's view of the world to the majority
community. Efforts for changes in emphasis must be provided: the
faculty member engaged for specific needs should be able to "spread his
or her wings" in the face of an impending vacancy, such that the new
applicant may be one who takes over some of the more senior colleague's
responsibilities in a certain field. This is a dynamic process. It will en-
sure an exciting, culturally diverse and rich academic community - and
that will allow the academy to serve most effectively the broader commu-
nity as the new century dawns.
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F. Conclusion
This Article has traced the rise and likely fall of race- and gender-
conscious preferential programs affecting minorities. Whether the more
restrictive decisions of the Supreme Court of recent vintage were upon us
or not, the qualification factors approach as a proposal for hiring prac-
tices seems far more fair than the existing systems. In this scenario, a
faculty and administration must figure out what they want a new em-
ployee to do. They need to define, assess needs, seek comments from
other members of the faculty as to their potential new needs, before they
advertise a job vacancy. Once such a position is identified, then hiring
can occur in a rational fashion. Gone will be the preoccupation with
certain pedigrees. What will emerge will be a truly diverse faculty, ap-
pointed with specific tasks in mind - tasks that, of course, may change,
but tasks which have been thought out. This new system will require
time and commitment - experimentation and change - but the enhanced
quality of legal education which may result seems to be a goal worthy of
pursuit.
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APPENDIX A
The value of racial, gender, political, pedagogical and cultural diver-
sity is assumed and will not be debated in this article. The literature
abounds with sensitive and thoughtful essays on these topics. (I also
have included some divergent views.) See, with regard to women in legal
education and feminism: Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's
Like to be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing
Women, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 799 (1988) (discussing the absence of wo-
men in legal education, the "system," and the sexually degrading re-
marks often uttered by Angel's male colleague - an excellent bibliography
of sources used by Angel is included, id. at 800 n.2).
Information for this article was also obtained from the following sources:
C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1981); K. MORELLO, The INVISIBLE BAR
(1986); Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137
(1988); Barnes, Women and Entrance to the Legal Profession, 23 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 276 (1970); Bysiewicz, 1972 AALS Questionnaire on Wo-
men in Legal Education, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503 (1973); Epstein, Wo-
men Lawyers and Their Profession: Inconsistency of Social Controls and
Their Consequences for Professional Performance, in THE PROFESSIONAL
WOMEN 669 (1971); Erickson, Legal Education: The Last Academic
Bastion of Sex Bias?, 10 NOVA L.J. 457 (1986); Erickson, Sex Bias in Law
School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988);
Faught, Update: The Status of Women Faculty in Illinois Law Schools,
74 ILL. B.J. 452 (1986); Fossum, Women in the Legal Profession: A Pro-
gress Report, 67 A.B.A. J. 578 (1981); Fossum, Women Law Professors,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903; Jacobs, Women in Law School: Struc-
tural Constraint and Personal Choice in the Formation of Professional
Identity, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462 (1972); Jason, Moody, & Schuerger,
The Woman Law Student: The View From the Front of the Classroom, 24
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 223 (1975); Robert & Winter, Sex-Role and Success in
Law School, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 449 (1978); Wald, Women in the Law:
Stage Two, 52 UMKC L. REV. 645 (1983); Weisberg, Women in Law
School Teaching: Problems and Progress, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 226 (1979);
White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1967); Winter, Sur-
vey: Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less, But They're Happy,
69 A.B.A. J. 1384 (1983); and Zenoff& Lorio, What We Know, What We
Think We Know, and What We Don't Know About Women Law Profes-
sors, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 6869 (1983).
A comprehensive issue of volume 39 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION entitled Women in Legal Education - Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and
Practice includes thoughtful comments.
Additional sources which are of interest include: Abrams, Gender Dis-
crimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1183 (1989) (commenting upon the workplace, sexual harassment,
"neutral" policies which undervalue women, new models for parenting,
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and the role of the workplace in one's life); Dalton, The Faithful Liberal
and the Question of Diversity, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1989); Mark-
off, Wisconsin Does the Impossible; Boosts Minority Ranks By Four,
NAT'L L.J. March 6, 1989, at 4, col. 1 (discussing the one-shot hiring of
four minorities by one law school); and Tobias, Respect for Diversity:
The Case of Feminist Legal Thought, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 175 (1989);
Concerning African-Americans: Alexander & Alexander, The New Ra-
cism: An Analysis of the Use of Racial and Ethnic Criteria in Decision-
Making, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 190 (1972) (discusses definitional
problems and generally argues against group identification as a lawful
basis for decisionmaking); Amaker, DeFacto Leadership and the Civil
Rights Movement: Perspective on the Problems and Role of Activists and
Lawyers in Legal and Social Change. 19 So. U. L. REV. 1, 17 n. 18 (1989)
(discussing small number of Black faculty members); Bell, Application of
the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA
L.J. 319 (1986) (discusses "problems" of too many minority faculty);
Bell, Stranger in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still
White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986); Brooks, Anti-Minority
Mindset in the Law School Personnel Process: Toward an Understanding
of Racial Mindsets, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 1 (1987) (comments upon a
predisposition to evaluate minority faculty more harshly); Bunzel, Mi-
nority Faculty Hiring, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 39 (19-) (commenting
upon federal government's early initiative to increase minority faculty
hiring at the expense of all standards); and Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward
a Race Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, - NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1.
For an article commenting upon the hiring of White males writing
about civil rights and social injustice, quoting each other, and ignoring
mention of nonwhite authors having personal experience concerning the
issue, see Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984), especially id. at 562
n.3. The exclusion of such nonwhites means that affirmative action is
approached from a social utility or distributive justice model rather than
premised on reparations:
Many of the minority scholars emphasize the reparations argument and
stress the inherent cost to whites; the [white male] author of the inner
circle generally make the case on the ground of utility or distributive
justice.
Id. at 569 & n. 45; Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools,
26 How. L.J. 443 (1983) (comprehensive study), see especially nn. 235-
66 and accompanying text which present minorities in teaching and the
special insights they bring in certain specialized cases; Littlejohn, Black
Law Professors: A Past. . . A Future? 64 MICH. BAR J. 539 (1985);
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibil-
ity and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 53 (1975); and Wonnell,
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Circumventing Racism: Confronting the Problem of Affirmative Action
Ideology, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 95 (discussing strategies to circumvent
racism: "affirmative action ideology as a tragic obstacle to needed
changes").
And for a melange of materials discussing affirmative action and the
relationship between African-Americans and women see: Austin,
Sapphine Bound!, 1989 Wisc. L. REV. 539 (importance of African-
American role models); Bergmann, Is There a Conflict between Racial
Justice and Women's Liberation?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 805 (1985); Kay,
Beyond Diversity: Accepting Difference, AALS NEWSLETTER, April
1989, at 1-3; Oppenheimer, Distinguishing Five Models of Affirmative Ac-
tion, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 42 (1988) (discussing variable passive-
aggressive models of affirmative action); and Chused, The Hiring and Re-
tention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculty, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988). Chused states:
Racial tokenism is alive and well at American law schools... [B]lack
professors in particular, tend to be tokens if they are present at all ....
About one third of all law schools in this [1986-87 school year] study
have one Black faculty member. Another three have just one. Less than
a tenth have more than three.
Women [in the 1986-87 school year] now constitute over one-third of
untenured faculty who are in tenure track positions .... Legal writing
moreover may be on its way to a "woman's job."
And for a contrary view, "what 'race conscious' or 'affirmative action'
means in actuality is the virtual abandonment of standards," see Groglin,
Race-Conscious Remedies, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 843, 87 (1985).
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